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  Fiscal decentralization has been a pressing issue in the academic discipline of 
public finance as well as empirical economics for years.  The conventional wisdom of 
fiscal decentralization advocates is that fiscal decentralization can facilitate the economic 
development of a country.  In addition, the World Bank and IMF have identified over 
sixty countries where decentralization is an important element of development strategy.  
However, with the proliferating implementation of fiscal decentralization, the actual 
outcome has varied from country to country.  Indeed, some countries did benefit from 
the introduction of fiscal decentralization policy.  Meanwhile, quite a few other 
countries with a high degree of decentralization have suffered from economic crisis.  In 
other words, the relationship between fiscal decentralization and economic performance 
is still inconclusive.   
  A major barrier to understanding is the lack of well-defined theoretical framework 
to empirically measure fiscal decentralization in a policy relevant way.  The most widely 
used measurement is the ratio of sub-national government expenditure/revenue to total 
government expenditure/revenue.  But this indicator is criticized too simple to capture 
 
the dimensions of fiscal decentralization.  Specifically, it ignores key qualitative 
dimensions, such as taxing power, borrowing power and the independence of local 
officials, which are also very important to implementing fiscal decentralization.   
  The primary contribution of this dissertation is a novel theoretical framework for 
empirical measurement of fiscal decentralization.  The research question is: what types 
of fiscal decentralization system produce better economic performance?  The innovative 
methodology, the application of cluster analysis, enables us to incorporate the 
quantitative measurement of fiscal decentralization as well as qualitative dimensions.  
We go beyond the traditional way of measuring a country’s fiscal decentralization, 
treating it instead as a system with its own institutional design.  Adopting this method 
requires us investigate the institutional arrangement for fiscal decentralization in a 
country.  The institutional arrangement we review in detail includes: supra-national 
government, federal or unitary state, numbers of tiers of governments, taxing power, 
borrowing power, and independent local official.  These components have also been 
recognized by many economists and policy analysts.  What is original to this work is 
that, after identifying these institutional arrangements, we can group different countries 
with similar institutionally similar fiscal decentralization systems together in broad 
categories by using cluster analysis.  We are then in a position to measure the successes 
of each cluster according to several indicators, such as: economic performance, fiscal 
performance, and governance performance.  An inter- and intra-cluster comparison and 
one empirical model thus give a snapshot of the relationship between fiscal 
decentralization and economic performance.  The ultimate goal, for policy analysis, is to 
be able to distinguish the desirable institutional arrangements of fiscal decentralization 
from the less desirable ones.   
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Chapter I: Introduction 
    
   Fiscal decentralization, defined as the assignment of expenditure functions and 
revenue sources to sub-national levels of government, has become a clear trend in 
government reform in both developed countries as well as in transition economies.  
Traditional fiscal decentralization research focuses on the resulting economic benefits 
which accrue to its use.  It has been argued, for example, that local governments are 
presumed to be more informed as to the demographics of their respective jurisdictions, 
and therefore will allocate public resources more efficiently and more effectively than 
the central government could.  The World Bank has identified more than sixty 
countries where decentralization is an essential component of development strategy.   
   With the proliferation of fiscal decentralization practices around the globe, 
research studies have focused on the causes behind, and motivations for, a particular 
country’s undertaking the reforms necessary to bring about fiscal decentralization.  
Some contend that, with the approach of globalization, governments no longer wield 
the financial power of a monopoly.  In a global market, competition originates not 
only from neighboring countries but also from countries at such a distance they had 
not previously constituted a competitive threat.  To compete in the global economy, 
industrial reorganization is insufficient.  Governments must be able to restructure the 
ways in which they operate, and to respond to the rapid changes and unfamiliar 
challenges which globalization requires.  Furthermore, with the increasing pressure 
in many countries for democratization, these governments can no longer afford to 
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ignore expressions of discontent and frustration demonstrated by their citizenry in the 
matter of providing necessary and adequate public services.   
   In order to successfully cope with the public’s ever-increasing demands and to 
reduce the transaction costs inherent in providing timely public services in an 
evenly-distributed fashion, national governments must adapt to the varied and 
complex transformations occurring everywhere today.  There are a number of ways 
which governments may undertake to achieve their goals.  One way many experts 
believe offers great promise is through fiscal decentralization.  It has been argued 
that the sub-national government is much more likely to know the local needs and is 
therefore more capable of delivering adequate levels of public services than national 
government are or could be, due primarily to the fact that most local governments are 
more closely scrutinized and have the local oversight of those living under its 
jurisdiction.  This provides corresponding levels of accountability for local 
governments, which is higher and more certain than is possible with the central 
government.  This has, in fact, led national governments in recent times to attempt to 
leverage this position by decentralizing many of the duties and responsibilities 
previously held by the national governmental entity to lower and more localized 
levels of governments. 
   Tanzi (2002) has argued that the trend toward decentralization has its origins 
in several different loci.  First, deepening democratization has given citizens greater 
rights and freedoms to express their preferences for a more optimal provision of 
public goods and services.  Second, globalization is creating market areas that are no 
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longer identical to, or aligned with, strictly national boundaries.  That is, competition 
is no longer confined within a nation’s boundaries.  National governments must 
compete with neighboring countries, while local governments must compete with 
other jurisdictional governments.  Third, decentralization is similar to the economic 
term, “superior good,” which becomes more desirable when incomes increase (Bahl 
& Linn 1992; Martinez-Vazquez & McNab 2003).  Fourth, marked differences in 
income distribution also play an important role in facilitating the trend toward fiscal 
decentralization because those who enjoy higher levels of disposable income are seen 
as naturally having different desires and priorities for the provision of public goods 
and services than do those who have less income. 
   Other issues loom large in the field of economics, as well as in public policy, 
in the current and ongoing debate over issues of fiscal decentralization.  One of the 
more pressing questions concerns the consequences of implementing fiscal 
decentralization: why have some states been able to succeed in this regard while 
others have failed?  This question is yet to be answered satisfactorily.  A brief 
comparison of two countries’ attempts in this area provides a cogent example of the 
dilemma.  Since the 1990s, China has embarked upon a series of reforms based on 
principles of fiscal decentralization, the implementation of which has been 
accompanied by double-digit economic growth rates. Argentina is also highly 
decentralized in terms of sub-national governments having expenditures and revenues 
as an acceptable percentage of the total government’s expenditures and revenues. 
Argentina, unlike China, experienced two major financial crises, in 1993 and 2001, 
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associated with undisciplined fiscal behavior by sub-national governments, for which 
the central government ultimately had to take responsibility (Mussa, 2002).   
   It is a point of contention that an effective course of action would include 
different considerations; i.e., rather than only re-assigning public resources to lower 
levels of government, grant discretionary powers, such as taxing, and borrowing, as 
well as the power to independently appoint personnel at the sub-government level as 
well.   
      These issues have served to highlight the importance of effective institutional 
arrangements to insure the ultimate success of fiscal decentralization policies.  This 
dissertation takes the view that success requires rethinking the ways in which this 
process is undertaken, and asserts that it is the institutional design of a fiscal system 
rather than simply the reallocation of public resources to appropriate levels of 
government which will ultimately determine success or failure.  Just as fiscal 
decentralization can be variously defined, so, too, are there various approaches to 
implementing policies based on principles of fiscal decentralization.  Some of the 
implementations may require only the reassignment of public resources, while others 
may go further and emphasize the concomitant need for structural reform, including 
the granting of greater autonomy and responsibility to lower level governmental 
entities. 
   The significance of successful outcomes regarding fiscal decentralization has 
given rise to a number of public finance experts who have attempted to formulate 
normative studies and well-functioning institutional arrangements in this regard, 
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rather than focusing solely on the reallocation of public resources.  Bahl (1999b) 
expresses the view that fiscal decentralization should be regarded as a system with 
different components.  Each component can be a method to implement fiscal 
decentralization.  Bahl & Martinez-Vazquez (2005) further illustrate this concept 
with a normative approach to sequencing fiscal decentralization.   
  The dissertation accepts the view that fiscal decentralization should be 
regarded as a fiscal system.  However, our emphasis focuses on an individual 
country’s unique mix of institutional arrangements to implement fiscal 
decentralization, leading them to develop different components of the system they 
identify toward that end.  The focal point of this research is to identify the different 
types of fiscal decentralization systems that are currently implemented.  Each type of 
fiscal decentralization system may, and likely will, demonstrate much diversified 
performance strength and weaknesses.  Two research questions are presented and 
studied in this dissertation:  
 1.  What types of fiscal decentralization plans have been or are currently being 
     implemented?   
 2.  What are the performance strengths and weaknesses of various types of  
        fiscally decentralized systems?          
The first question will be addressed using cluster analysis, while the second question 
will be examined through an investigation of the inter- and intra-cluster performance 
comparison, and one empirical model.   
      Currently, there is a large and wide-ranging literature focusing on the issues 
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that are relevant to the question of whether fiscal decentralization will deliver the 
economic benefits that its advocates claim.  The literature, therefore, primarily 
discusses and analyzes relationships between fiscal decentralization and economic 
performance.  Results of the examinations of the theoretical underpinnings of fiscal 
decentralization remain inconclusive, while empirical studies of fiscal 
decentralization are considered controversial and problematic.  Two main problems 
remain unresolved in the empirical analysis literature.  They are: (1) the absence of 
qualitative indicators for measuring fiscal decentralization; and (2) the endogenous 
problem inherent in the empirical models.   
  The first problem is of particular importance in this literature.  The current 
and most widely used fiscal decentralization indicator, sub-national government 
revenue and expenditure as a percentage of total government revenue and expenditure, 
has been criticized as a too-simplistic a measure to accurately gauge the degree of 
fiscal decentralization among the nations embarking on this course of action.  The 
qualitative dimensions of fiscal decentralization, such as the power of sub-national 
governments to decide issues such as the appropriate tax base, tax rate, and borrowing 
power etc., must be considered.  Lack of consideration for the qualitative indicator, 
in our viewpoint, would lead to biased and specious empirical estimations of fiscal 
decentralization on economic development.  The second problem, while not as 
significant as a public policy issue, nevertheless poses a threat to these empirical 
analyses as more and more studies begin to question whether fiscal decentralization is 
simply one endogenous variable to economic growth.  
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  In accordance with the aforementioned statements and arguments, innovation 
for this fiscal decentralization topic would require going beyond the simple 
formulation of a comprehensive indicator, and to base our analysis on the more 
fruitful typological approach to measure the diverse nature of fiscal decentralization 
in countries while also incorporating institutional factors into the model to investigate 
the relationship between the types of fiscal decentralization systems and economic 
performance.   
  With these imperatives foremost, we endeavor in the present study to establish 
a model that can properly exhibit the multi-faceted dimensions of fiscal 
decentralization and then use it to classify the various countries’ fiscal 
decentralization systems based on their customized institutional arrangements.  In 
this dissertation, we do not attempt to deal with any issues surrounding the question of 
whether there is a statistical association between fiscal decentralization and economic 
performance; rather, we delve into other issues that heretofore have not received the 
attention they deserve.  First, we employ cluster analysis to determine what types of 
fiscal decentralization system are currently implemented; then, we investigate the 
differences in economic performance by conducting inter-cluster comparisons on 
several major indicators.   Undertaking this study, however, also requires accurate 
measurements of fiscal decentralization.  The currently used quantitative indicators 
are not appropriate to serve that function in this dissertation.  We suggest that the 
qualitative dimensions of fiscal decentralization should also be considered. 
  In this chapter, we outline the goals and the methodological plan for this 
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dissertation, as well as the motivation underlying this selected topic.  Cluster 
analysis refers to a wide variety of techniques used to group entities into 
homogeneous sub-groups on the basis of their similarities.  The technique helps to 
reduce the complexity of a dataset and thereby enhance our ability to accurately 
predict an attribute of observations.  Considering the multiple-dimensions of fiscal 
decentralization, we regard cluster analysis as particularly parsimonious and efficient 
and is therefore an ideal method for conducting our research on this topic.   
  After the initial classification of fiscal decentralization systems using cluster 
analysis, we will also examine each cluster to further identify inter-cluster 
performance differences, e.g., structural similarities characterizing the cluster; 
structure differences across clusters.  Utilizing this technique allows us to examine 
whether there is substantiating evidence regarding the link between fiscal 
decentralization and economic performance.  Currently, we are attempting to 
examine the indicators of economic performance, fiscal performance, and governance 
performance.  We then explore the relationship between different types of fiscal 
decentralization systems and performance indicators with two empirical models. 
  Using these innovative methods and this statistical analysis, we can investigate 
the current policy issue of fiscal decentralization; furthermore, the creation here of 
comprehensive measurements of fiscal decentralization would make original 
contributions to this field of study.  In brief, the structure of research can be depicted 
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Chapter II: Literature review and arrangement 
 
   Several parts of the fiscal decentralization literature are reviewed in this 
chapter.  Presented first are several theoretical arguments regarding fiscal 
decentralization have been proposed since the pioneering work of Oates (1972).  As 
mentioned previously, most theoretical arguments on fiscal decentralization focus on 
the economic benefit that may ensue.  Thus, early in the literature review, those 
studies concerned with the relationship between fiscal decentralization and economic 
performance are examined.  Next the focus is on the previous literature that attempts 
to create comprehensive measurements and typologies of fiscal decentralization.  
Finally, we examine the prior use of the major tools of this dissertation in literature for 
social science studies, viz., cluster analysis and empirical analysis.   
 
I. Literature Review 
1. Theoretical arguments 
   Theoretical arguments surrounding fiscal decentralization have been the 
subject of investigation by economists as well as by policy analysts.  This theoretical 
examination was first undertaken by the pioneering works of Tiebout (1956), 
Musgrave (1959), and Oates (1972).  Fiscal decentralization is widely advocated on 
the premise that it improves economic performance by increasing economic efficiency 
in the provision of public sector services.  Some, however, argue that fiscal 
decentralization can impact economic performance when sub-national governments 
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have uncontrolled expenditures, which adversely affects national fiscal policy.  
Macroeconomic stability may be hampered by the sub-national government’s 
spending.  Consequently, in the following paragraphs we canvass the arguments 
regarding both the positive and the negative effects of fiscal decentralization policy.  
      Several arguments are put forth to support the view that fiscal decentralization 
can engender economic growth.  The first and most widely accepted argument is that 
fiscal decentralization enhances economic efficiency (Oates, 1972).  This argument 
relies heavily on the premise that the sub-national government is more in tune with 
local needs and is thus much more capable than the national government in delivering 
necessary services and collecting taxes.   
  After this theoretical examination, a number of empirical studies investigate 
the relationship between fiscal decentralization and economic growth since the 1990s, 
including Kim (1995), Davoodi, Xie & Zou (1995), Davoodi & Zou (1998), 
Martinez-Vazquez & McNab (1998, 2001a, 2003), Zhang & Zou (1997, 1998), Lin & 
Liu (2000), McNab (2001), DeSai (2003) and Lee (2003).  Some of the empirical 
studies are conducted with cross-country datasets while other experiments focus on 
case studies within a single country but use datasets comprising various national 
regions.  We find that both cross-country experiments and case studies yield 
inconsistent conclusions on the issue of whether fiscal decentralization promotes 
economic growth. 
  The next argument postulates that fiscal decentralization can improve 
economic performance through strengthening a country’s governance.  A growing 
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body of literature has emerged in recent years that recognize a positive association 
between decentralization and governance.  Inman & Rubinfeld (1997) assert that 
fiscal decentralization has been shown to strengthen social capital and encourage 
political participation that usually leads to a higher level of accountability for 
government behavior.  By fostering the emergence and strengthening of democratic 
institutions, fiscal decentralization reduces opportunities for malfeasance and the 
misallocation of public resources.  Resources that would otherwise be diverted are 
then available for investment and for the provision of public goods, thereby enhancing 
long-term economic growth (McNab, 2001).  Fiscal decentralization has been further 
credited with fostering central bank independence (CBI) and thereby ensuring 
transparency in government as well as in the banking sector (Huther & Shah, 1998).   
  With respect to the argument of democratic governance, many empirical 
studies have also been undertaken to test this argument.  Some scholars focus on the 
relationship between fiscal decentralization and corruption (Fishman & Gatti 2000; 
Gurgur & Shah 2002), while others associate fiscal decentralization with some type of 
general governance indicator, ranging from citizen participation, transparency in 
government, the rule of law, among others (Huther & Shah 1998; DeMello & 
Barenstein 2001).  Despite the diversity of conclusions with regard to the issue of 
fiscal decentralization versus economic growth, there appears to be greater consensus 
among the empirical conclusions on the issue of whether fiscal decentralization 
promotes improved governance.   
  Third, fiscal decentralization is said to promote economic performance by 
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enhancing macroeconomic stability.  Fukasaku & DeMello (1998) contend that fiscal 
decentralization is expected to promote sound macroeconomic management through 
efforts that streamline public sector activities, reduce operational and informational 
costs of service delivery, which thus stimulate private sector development.  However, 
Ter-Minassian (1997a) asserts there are significant costs associated with insuring 
macroeconomic stability through fiscal decentralization.  Achieving this goal 
requires thoroughly disciplined sub-national borrowing.  As to the empirical studies, 
in relation to this argument, there is less focus in the literature regarding the 
relationship between fiscal decentralization and macroeconomic stability.  The 
primary explanation stems from the fact that macroeconomic stability has a high level 
of relevancy to economic growth.  As a result, some take the view that 
macroeconomic stability is the indirect effect of fiscal decentralization on economic 
growth (Lee, 2003).  
  Fukasaku & DeMello (1998) have conducted the first empirical study using 
cross-country datasets searching for the association between fiscal decentralization 
and macroeconomic stability.  Fukasaku & DeMello use the central government’s 
fiscal balance, inflation, and M2 growth as the indicator for macroeconomic stability.  
Their findings suggest that fiscal decentralization is likely to generate fiscal and 
monetary imbalances that impair the performance of economic growth in developing 
countries.  OECD countries are, nevertheless, better equipped to reap the benefits of 
fiscal decentralization while maintaining the fiscal discipline that appears to lead to 
increased economic growth.   
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  These findings are consistent with the argument that fiscal decentralization is a 
superior good, proposed by Bahl & Linn (1992) and Tanzi (2002), who posit that it is 
only at relatively high levels of per capita income that decentralization becomes 
sufficiently attractive to taxpayers that its benefits can be fully exploited, unburdened 
by the experiences of countries with a lower level of per capita income.   
  Fourth, those who contend that fiscal decentralization bears an inverse 
relationship to the size of the public sector are considered.  Brennan & Buchanan 
(1980) contend that fiscal decentralization is itself a powerful constraint on Leviathan: 
competition among governments in the context of the “inter-jurisdictional mobility of 
persons in pursuit of fiscal gains can offer partial or possibly complete substitutes for 
explicit fiscal constraints on the taxing power” (Brennan & Buchanan 1980, pp. 184).  
Accordingly, the Leviathan model implies that, with all other things being equal, the 
size of the public sector bears an inverse relationship to the extent of fiscal 
decentralization (Oates 1985, pp. 748).  
  Oates (1985) also played a pioneering role in empirical studies exploring the 
relationship between fiscal decentralization and public sector size, but reached a 
different conclusion than Brennan and Buchanan.  Using a cross-sectional sample of 
57 countries, Oates’ findings suggest that a strong, systematic relationship does not 
exist between the size of government and the degree of centralization of the public 
sector.  Following Oates’ path-breaking study, Marlow (1988), Grossman (1989a, 
1989b), and Joulfaian & Marlow (1990) endeavored to test the Leviathan hypothesis.  
Their conclusions varied. 
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  Just as there are many arguments supporting the view that fiscal 
decentralization has a positive effect on economic performance, so there are numerous 
contentions in support of the opposing view: that fiscal decentralization may hamper 
economic performance.  First, contrary to the arguments proposed by Oates (1972), 
Prud’homme (1995) in fact suggests that fiscal decentralization can actually 
undermine economic efficiency.  Prud’homme believes the arguments presented by 
Oates are rooted in fragile ground.  He argues that not only do locally elected 
officials not always satisfy the preferences of local needs, but, that,even if the locally 
elected officials seek to satisfy the preferences of local needs, the local bureaucracy 
does not always go along with the expectations of elected officials.  Consequently, 
Prud’homme regards as problematic the assumption that fiscal decentralization 
necessarily promotes economic efficiency.  Prud’homme further suggests that 
providing a given local public service entails economies of scale.  The welfare losses 
attributable to economies of scale that would result from decentralization always 
remain a distinct possibility.  So the oft-cited argument for economic efficiency is in 
fact undermined by fiscal decentralization. 
  The argument that fiscal decentralization promotes economic performance by 
increasing political participation and improving governance has encountered criticism.  
Conyers (1990) holds a different view and contends that decentralization may 
increase the participation of people at the local level, but sometimes it is only a small 
privileged elite group who actually get to participate.  And, such elites may often 
pursue their own narrowly focused self-interests, which may be divergent from those 
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of the rest of the local populace.  Viewed in this light, fiscal decentralization may 
indeed promote participation in the democratic process, but it would not necessarily 
improve economic performance.  Tanzi (2002) recognizes the existence of a 
relationship between decentralization and corruption because sub-national institutions 
are usually less developed than those of the central government due to the fact that 
local governments provides lower salaries, fewer prospects for advancement, and a 
weaker mechanism for surveillance and therefore for accountability.  Under these 
circumstances, the problem of corruption may be more severe and widespread in local 
governments than in central ones. 
  Third, there appears to be a potential conflict between fiscal decentralization 
and macroeconomic policy.   Musgrave (1959), for example, recognized this 
problem nearly 50 years ago.  He believes it becomes more difficult to coordinate 
fiscal policy in a counter-cyclical sense under a decentralized fiscal structure.  
Prud’homme (1995) also considers the possibility that the fiscal behavior of 
sub-national governments would run counter to fiscal policies of central governments.  
For example, local governments may try to increase expenditures or raise taxes while 
the central government is trying to reduce spending or cut taxes.  Such unhappy 
coincidences may jeopardize overall macroeconomic stability.  Bogoev (1991) also 
uses the case study of the former Yugoslavia, one of the most decentralized countries 
in the world, to illustrate how a federal government can be unable to implement its 
fiscal policy, simultaneously engendering both high inflation and poor 
macroeconomic management.  
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  Fourth, fiscal decentralization provides a strong incentive for sub-national 
governments to borrow, which, in turn, may lead to a national debt crisis.  Local 
governments tend to incur a large number of debts when they are convinced that the 
central government will bail them out in a crisis.  Tanzi (2002) indicates that in past 
years these fiscal crises have loomed large in some developing countries, such as 
Argentina and Brazil.  
 
2. Measurements and typology of fiscal decentralization 
  We can conclude from the discussion in the previous section that there are a 
considerable number of controversies brewing in the literature over the issue of the 
relationship between fiscal decentralization and economic performance.  Moreover, 
the empirical analyses regarding fiscal decentralization are under serious attack.  The 
most apparent flaw in these empirical analyses is the measurement of fiscal 
decentralization.   
  These measurements of fiscal decentralization, used by the majority of 
empirical studies as an explanatory variable, are mainly from the dataset Government 
Finance Statistics Yearbook (GFS), published by International Monetary Fund.  
These measurements are defined on the basis of a single dimension of decentralization:  
expenditures going through sub-national budgets, and revenues raised by sub-national 
governments.  In other words, the share of sub-national governments’ expenditure or 
revenue over the total government’s expenditure or revenue has been regarded as the 
indicator of fiscal decentralization.  Despite the dataset’s wide usage in empirical 
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studies, there are several limitations on this measurement, as explained by Ebel & 
Yilmaz (2002, pp. 6): 
 Although GFS provides a breakdown of expenditure by function and economic 
type, it does not identify the degree of local expenditure autonomy. 
 GFS does not distinguish the sources of tax and non-tax revenues, 
intergovernmental transfers, and other grants. 
 GFS does not disclose what proportion of intergovernmental transfers is 
conditional, as opposed to general-purpose, and whether transfers are distributed 
according to an objective criteria or a discretionary measure.  
Suffering from such limitations, the GFS fiscal decentralization measurements, 
although widely used, are problematically deficient in measuring the accuracy of 
fiscal decentralization because the sub-national expenditure/revenue calculation 
includes conditional transfers from the central government.  As a consequence, the 
indicator ends up as an overestimate of fiscal decentralization, to varying degrees.  
Musgrave (1959) has also properly pointed out that “local governments which act as 
central expenditure agents do not reflect expenditure decentralization in a meaningful 
sense, just as centrally collected but shared taxes do not constitute true revenue 
decentralization” (Musgrave 1959, pp. 342). 
  In addition to the problem of overestimating fiscal decentralization, there 
exists the problem of comparing “apples to oranges” in cross-country empirical 
studies.  Bahl & Nath (1986) argue that two countries may have the same 
sub-national share of expenditure/revenue but the number of participating 
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sub-national governments may in fact be quite different.  Under these circumstances, 
the country with more sub-national governments is supposed to be more decentralized 
than the country with fewer sub-national units.  But it is difficult to distinguish the 
true differences between these two countries given this inherent limitation in the data 
from these studies.   
  As a result of these shortcomings, the actual relationship between fiscal 
decentralization and economic performance may be difficult to estimate based on the 
currently used indicator since we are unable to unequivocally identify which country 
is more fiscally decentralized.  Many scholars, therefore, are beginning to take the 
view that the current empirical studies are problematic and their resulting estimations 
are specious and biased (Bahl & Nath 1986; Ebel & Yilmaz 2002; Martinez-Vazquez 
& McNab 2003).   
  The foregoing arguments reveal an Achilles’ heel in the most widely-used 
measurement with GFS data; that is, it does not adequately reflect the true 
multi-dimensional nature of fiscal decentralization. Consequently, not only 
quantitative data, but also some qualitative indicators of fiscal decentralization from 
GFS (such as whether the sub-national government is empowered to adjust the tax 
rate and the tax base), must be considered.   
  There have been a number of efforts made to clarify this pressing issue.  
Recognizing that fiscal decentralization has many dimensions, OECD (2002) has 
embarked upon the task of constructing more detailed definitions of sub-national 
government revenue as follows: 
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(a)  SNG sets tax rate and tax base; 
(b)  SNG sets tax rate only; 
(c)  SNG sets tax base only; 
(d)  SNG sets tax base for SNG and central government tax; 
(e)  Revenue sharing arrangement; 
 (e.1)  Revenue-split can only be changed with consent of SNG; 
 (e.2)  Revenue-split fixed in legislation, may unilaterally be changed by  
            central government; 
 (e.3)  Revenue-split determined annually by central government as part of  
            the budget; 
(f) Central government sets rate and base of SNG tax. 
Despite having further refined the categories of sub-national revenue sources and 
taking into consideration fiscal autonomy, the OECD documentation does not contain 
the cross-country, time-series dataset, resulting in continuing difficulties in conducting  
empirical analyses using OECD datasets.  
  Following OECD’s work, the World Bank (2004) has also attempted to create 
comprehensive qualitative indicators for more accurate measurements of fiscal 
decentralization.  Their goal is the availability of data on key fiscal, political and 
administrative variables at the national and sub-national level.  In this way, 
decentralization policy and outcomes can be assessed more effectively and accurately.   
  The World Bank’s measurements are comprised of two main groups: a 
quantitative indicator and a qualitative indicator.  The quantitative indicator is 
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currently used throughout the literature dealing with fiscal decentralization.  As for 
the qualitative indicator, the World Bank is currently constructing a qualitative 
indicator as follows: 
 Expenditure assignment; 
 Revenue assignment; 
 Regulatory framework for sub-national borrowing; and 
 Characteristics of the transfer system. 
The cross-country dataset is used with the investigation of institutional arrangements 
for fiscal decentralization for the most recent year available. .  The World Bank’s 
dataset has made a breakthrough on the measurement of qualitative dimensions of 
fiscal decentralization.  Taking the assignment of revenue, for example, the data 
display which government levels are responsible for the different functions: setting 
the instrument, setting the tax rate, and administrating the tax.   
      Based on the OECD and the World Bank’s study, research is focusing more 
and more on the qualitative dimensions of fiscal decentralization in different regions.  
Brosio (2000) investigated the decentralization efforts of various African countries.  
He looked at the reform of the political and fiscal institutions in selected countries on 
that continent..  Dabla-Norris & Wade (2002) focus their studies on transition 
economies.  They first examine the context and experience of fiscal decentralization 
efforts in transition economies and then identify three critical principles of sound, 
desirable decentralization.  Ebel & Yilmaz (2003) have cited the four pillars of an 
intergovernmental fiscal system: expenditure assignment, revenue assignment, 
 21
 
intergovernmental transfers, and sub-national borrowing.  These four guidelines are 
used to analyze the institutional design present indifferent countries, divided into 
unitary states and federal states.   
      The aforementioned studies are based on the institutional approach, a useful 
way to understand the given arrangements within a fiscal decentralization system.  
Notably, these studies solve the problem of inaccurate measurements of 
multi-dimensional fiscal decentralization.  However, they fail to find a link between 
fiscal decentralization and economic performance.   
  Taking a different tack, one more similar to the approach followed here, 
Schneider (2003a, 2003b) has attempted to identify three different types of 
decentralization: (1) fiscal decentralization; (2) political decentralization; and (3) 
administrative decentralization.  However, he is not been able to measure the 
qualitative aspects of fiscal decentralization.  Daniel Treisman (2000b) defines five 
types of decentralization, which are structural, decision-making, resource, electoral, 
and institutional decentralization.  This definition has yielded a number of 
implications for fiscal decentralization.   
  Bahl (1999b) regards fiscal decentralization as a comprehensive system with 
many components.  Working with Bahl, the World Bank has identified four 
dimensions of fiscal decentralization.  These are: expenditure responsibility, revenue 
assignment, intergovernmental fiscal transfer, and sub-national borrowing.  
 
3. Tools for empirical work 
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  The procedure of this dissertation involves placing countries into groups based 
on common characteristics of their fiscal decentralization system, followed by an 
institutional analysis of each group.  Here, cluster analysis becomes a useful research 
tool. Currently, various social science studies have been undertaken with cluster 
analysis.  Dabrowski (1996) and Zinnes, Sachs & Eilat (2000) undertake research 
based on the pattern of economic development in transition economies.  Zinnes 
(1987) depicted a framework for fisheries industries in developing countries by 
recognizing nine components.  Each component was given several variables to 
capture the dimension.  The cluster analysis categorized the 64 countries into 10 
groups based on their development pattern.  This research has proved to be a great 
innovation in this work because the typology is able to distinguish the least favored 
type of fisheries industry, which has proven to be highly successful in policy analysis. 
 
II: Arrangement of the dissertation  
      As seen in previous sections, each country under study has a customized fiscal 
decentralization system.  Some emphasize tax autonomy while others stress the 
importance of expenditure autonomy.  With all these features and characteristics, we 
can assign countries with similar fiscal decentralization systems together.  This 
allows the use of a cluster analysis approach as a reliable way to examine patterns of 
fiscal decentralization. 
1. Chapter III: A typology of fiscal decentralization system 
   The major focus in Chapter III concerns the typology of fiscal decentralization.  
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The ideal sample size for this analysis is around 100 countries.  We anticipate that 
for some countries more than one observation will be included if there is a significant 
change in their fiscal decentralization systems.  However, due to an insufficiency of 
data, it may be necessary to reduce the sample size to approximately 60 countries.  
The purpose of this particular technique, on the one hand, is to expand the sample 
observation for the analysis.  On the other hand, in consideration of the changing 
nature of fiscal decentralization systems, particularly for the developing countries, we 
take the viewpoint that panel data would more adequately address this issue. 
   This chapter begins by building upon past research to argue for a limited but 
comprehensive set of dimensions for fiscal decentralization.  It proceeds to identify 
the variables which capture each dimension.  Combining the World Bank’s 
dimensions with the viewpoints of other scholars who emphasize the importance of 
political decentralization, it is possible to tentatively capture the features of fiscal 
decentralization systems with the following variables: 
1. Political structure: possible measures of supranational government, federal state or 
non-federal state, numbers of tiers in sub-national government. 
2. Intergovernmental transfer: possible measures of sub-national government 
revenue transfer as a percentage of sub-national government total revenue. 
3. Tax autonomy: possible measures of sub-national government tax revenue as a 
percentage of sub-national government total revenue, that is, their taxing power. 
4. Expenditure assignment: possible measures for sub-national government 
expenditures as a percentage of total government expenditure.  
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5. Revenue assignment: possible measures of sub-national government revenue as a 
percentage of total government revenue. 
6. Borrowing power: possible measures for determining whether the sub-national 
government has the power to borrow. 
7. Political decentralization: possible measures for state elections, municipal 
elections. 
8. Hard budget constraints: possible measures of whether the sub-national 
government’s borrowing activities are guaranteed.  
We would expect to identify 6 to 8 types of fiscal decentralization systems on the 
basis of these known components of fiscal decentralization policy. 
2. Chapter IV: Inter-cluster comparison 
  After completing the cluster analysis, the clusters will be further investigated 
to identify inter-cluster performance and the presence of behavioral differences.  The 
panel dataset will be used to advantage in these investigations.  Each country will be 
further examined to determine whether there is any difference in its fiscal 
decentralization system. 
  The most important indicator for performance is the economic growth rate 
determined primarily from 1990 to 2004.  The reason this time period was chosen is 
that characteristics and features of fiscal decentralization system for various countries 
were collected between 1998 and 2002.  The performance of economic growth 
between 1998 and 2004 can be more properly associated with the types of fiscal 
decentralization systems.  Nevertheless, to avoid the short-term spike of economic 
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performance, we extend the time period of economic performance to the early 1990s.  
The results are inconclusive as to whether fiscal decentralization leads to economic 
growth; it would be problematic to conclude prematurely whether fiscal 
decentralization is positively or negatively associated with economic growth. 
  Another performance indicator that may be connected to fiscal 
decentralization would be the level of government revenue deficits.  Based on the 
theoretical arguments of fiscal decentralization, the distribution of public resources is 
more effective and efficient under a decentralized fiscal system.  As a result, fiscal 
deficit is a reasonable indicator for performance differences. 
  The quality of government is also observed by investigating indicators of 
corruption and of government effectiveness.  As seen in the section on the literature 
review, fiscal decentralization is also said to promote better governance of a country.  
Therefore, based on this theoretical argument, we may regard the corruption indicator 
and government efficacy as areas with considerable implications for this analysis.  In 
brief, the test of performance can be summarized as follows: 
 Economic performance: economic growth rate, inflation rate, and level of 
income, mainly the GDP per capita in PPP value. 
 Fiscal performance: levels of budget deficit, government debt/GDP. 
 Governance performance: corruption; government effectiveness. 
3. Chapter V: Empirical model analysis 
      In the previous chapter preliminary observations were made by employing 
inter-cluster comparisons regarding the relationship among different types of fiscal 
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decentralization systems as well as several indicators of performance.  The 
inter-cluster comparison, however, is limiting in its ability to provide us with a 
significant viewpoint on this relationship because it is limited to descriptive statistical 
analysis rather than the more accurate inferential statistical analysis.  In this chapter, 
we employ an empirical model to further explore and identify the relationship 
between different types of fiscal decentralization systems and their economic 
performance.   
4. Chapter VI: Conclusions and policy implications 
  The analysis in previous chapters provides the basis for developing specific 
conclusions and policy recommendations in this chapter.  These recommendations 
carry implications for current debates in the literature and for the interpretations of 
our results.  
  In this chapter, we expect to answer the following questions:  
1.  What type of fiscal decentralization system is currently being implemented? 
2.  What are the performance strengths and weaknesses of various types of  
    fiscal decentralization system? 
      These findings could prove potentially significant and far-reaching in their 
implications for the direction of future reform of fiscal systems in developing 
countries, as well as serve to strengthen the institutional arrangements of fiscal 





Chapter III: A typology of fiscal decentralization systems 
 
I. Identifying the dimensions of fiscal decentralization systems 
  In chapter II, it was established that each country has its own customized fiscal 
decentralization system.  Some emphasize tax autonomy while others stress the 
importance of autonomy in expenditures.  Having identified these various features 
and characteristics, we now group countries with similar fiscal decentralization 
systems together.  In addition, the OECD (2002) and the World Bank (2004) each 
proposed a different method of measuring fiscal decentralization, which provide a 
useful tool to capture the significant dimensions of fiscal decentralization.  These 
dimensions and characteristics, mentioned in the previous chapter, will be used to 
categorize the different types of fiscal decentralization systems.   
  Currently, the most systematic and logical construction of a fiscal 
decentralization system is proposed by Bahl (1999).  In his pioneering theory of 
fiscal decentralization systems, he proposed 12 implementation rules for fiscal 
decentralization: 
Rule #1: Fiscal decentralization should be viewed as a comprehensive system, 
Rule #2: Finance follows function, 
Rule #3: There must be a strong central ability to monitor and evaluate 
decentralization, 
Rule #4: One intergovernmental system does not fit both the urban and the rural 
sectors of a country, 
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Rule #5: Fiscal decentralization requires significant local government taxing powers, 
Rule #6: Central governments must adhere to the fiscal decentralization rules they 
make,  
Rule #7: Keep it simple, 
Rule #8: The design of the intergovernmental transfer system should match the 
objectives of decentralization reform, 
Rule #9: Fiscal decentralization should consider all three levels of government, 
Rule #10: Impose a hard budget constraint, 
Rule #11: Recognize that intergovernmental systems are always in transition and plan 
for this, 
Rule #12: There must be a champion for fiscal decentralization. 
  Although these 12 implementation rules do not specify the dimensions and 
characteristics of an FDS, they do constitute alternative thinking on fiscal 
decentralization.  In later work, Bahl, along with Martinez-Vazquez (2005), has 
further argued for normative dimensions of fiscal decentralization theory.  In their 
paper, “Sequencing Fiscal Decentralization,” they have identified the components of a 








Table 3.1: Fiscal decentralization components by Bahl and Martinez-Vazquez 
Component Desirable Feature 
Representation Popular election of executive and legislative branches 
Chief Officers Locally appointed 
Expenditure Discretion Significant control over how money is spent 
Budget Local approval; hard budget constraints 
Revenue Significant local power; discretion to change rates in a 
closed list of taxes 
Intergovernmental 
equalization transfers 
Unconditional and formula driven 
Conditional grant Block grants using formulas or other objective 
allocations; matching 
Borrowing power Broad borrowing powers and hard budget constraints 
Civil service Local governments hire, fire and determine 
compensation 
 
These components are of great value in identifying the dimensions of fiscal 
decentralization; but, these indicators are all qualitative in nature.  The qualitative 
components may be either hard to quantify or may prove to be equally difficult to 
substitute with proxy variables.  Therefore, even though the components of fiscal 
decentralization have been identified, more efforts are still required to quantify the 
qualitative dimensions of fiscal decentralization.  
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  On the other hand, Treisman (2000) also contends that there are five 
definitions of decentralization that also contributes to identifying their dimensions.  
The first is what he calls structural decentralization, which refers to the number of 
tiers present in forms of government.  The more tiers there are, the more 
decentralized is the system.  The second definition is decision decentralization, 
which focuses on the scope of issues about which sub-national governments can make 
autonomous decisions.  The third is resource decentralization, which refers to how 
government resources are distributed between central and sub-national governments.  
The fourth is electoral decentralization, which refers to the method by which 
sub-national officials are selected.  Decentralization is greater with locally elected 
officials than when local officials are appointed by the central government.  Last is 
institutional decentralization, concerning the degree to which sub-national 
governments or their representatives have formal rights within the procedures for 
central decision-making.  
  Treisman’s work is intended to define political decentralization; however, 
several of his definitions prove to be a great help in analyzing the various dimensions 
of fiscal decentralization.  For instance, resource decentralization is the main spirit of 
fiscal decentralization theory, while decision and electoral decentralization have also 
been emphasized in the literature.   
  Lastly, Schneider (2003) takes a different view by separating fiscal 
decentralization from administrative decentralization and political decentralization.  
He defines three dimensions for decentralization that are fiscal, administrative, and 
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political decentralization.  He also assigns two indicators to capture each dimension 
of decentralization as follows: 




1. Sub-national expenditures as a percentage of 
total expenditures 




1. Taxation as a percentage of sub-national 
revenues 
2. Non-transfer income as a percentage of 
sub-national revenues 
Political decentralization  1. Municipal elections 
2. State elections 
 
Judging from Schneider’s indicators, we find that the dimensions of administrative 
decentralization and political decentralization are also essential for the dimensions of 
fiscal decentralization systems.  We can, therefore, encompass the administrative and 
political decentralization elements into the fiscal decentralization system.  
      Therefore, based on previous arguments and propositions, it is possible to 
draw conclusions regarding the features of a fiscal decentralization system. Unlike the 
traditional method for measuring fiscal decentralization, that is, the ratio of 
sub-national government expenditures to revenue, experts in public finance have been 
more concerned with qualitative aspects of fiscal decentralization, including political 
decentralization, the power to tax and borrow money as measures of the level of fiscal 
decentralization.  Bahl and Martinez-Vazquez (1999; 2005), for example, both 
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emphasized the importance of an independent local official.  The independent local 
official should not only be elected by local people, but also possess the power of 
appointing local officials.   
      Meanwhile, along with political decentralization, Treisman (2000) further 
stressed that the political structure of a country as well as its decision-making process 
is important to the success of decentralization.  He argued, for example, that the 
federal state is inherently more decentralized than the unitary state in terms of its 
decision-making process.  On the other hand, supra-national governments have been 
positively viewed as wielding sufficient constraints over the fiscal policies and 
practices of a given country, much like the relationship that exists between the 
European Union and its member countries.  Therefore, the existence of a 
supra-national government1 regime also plays an important role for the 
implementation of fiscal decentralization.   
      Lastly, a hard budget constraint is identified by many scholars as important to 
the success of fiscal decentralization.  Argentina is extremely fiscally decentralized 
in many aspects of its institutional arrangements.  Nevertheless, without proper hard 
budget constraints on its sub-national governments’ borrowing activity, the fiscal 
decentralization policy resulted in serious financial crises in the early 1990s and 
2000s (Mussa, 2002). 
      In other words, many aspects of qualitative indicators are proposed that are 
                                                 
1 Supra-national government is commonly abbreviated “SNG.”.  However, in this dissertation, SNG 





relevant to the proper functioning of fiscal decentralization.  Along with the widely 
used quantitative indicators, i.e., the SNG share of expenditure/revenue to the total 
government’s expenditure/revenue, it is possible to build upon past research to argue 
for a limited yet comprehensive set of dimensions to identify fiscal decentralization 
systems.  As a result, an attempt is made to depict a framework for the function of 
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Figure 3.1: Framework for Fiscal Decentralization System 
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II. Variables for the dimensions of a fiscal decentralization system 
   The preceding theoretical arguments and contentions lead to the conclusion that 
the dimensions for a fiscal decentralization system would be numerous and diverse.  
Recognizing the dimensions of fiscal decentralization is not difficult when they are 
viewed as a comprehensive system.  The challenge of fiscal decentralization system 
theory is determining the means of discovering all the relevant and available variables in 
order to accurately capture each dimension of the system.  Some dimensions may be 
difficult to quantify while others may have problems with data availability. To conduct 
this analysis, feasible and practical variables are required.  
  Taking these difficulties into consideration, several criteria have emerged for 
selecting the dimensions and characteristics important for the use of cluster analysis. 
1. Quantifiability: the dimensions should be quantifiable; 
2. Feasibility: the variables used to capture the dimensions should be relevant; 
3. Credibility: the variables should be objective and credible; 
4. Availability: data availability for the variables is essential. 
  Based on these criteria, several temporary components and relevant variables are 









Table 3.3: Components of a fiscal decentralization system 





A supranational government, such as the EU, may 
constrain the fiscal policy of a country. Thus,  fiscal 
decentralization policy may be hampered. 1 is for yes; 
0 is for none. 
Political Structure*  Federal or unitary state? 
 
Numbers of tiers of 
sub-national government 
The federal state is generally more decentralized than a 
the unitary state. 1 is for federal; 0 is for unitary. 
The greater the numbers of tiers of sub-national 
government, the more decentralized the country. 
Transfer Revenue** SNG transfer revenue/SNG 
total revenue 
 
Sub-national transfer revenue as a percentage of total 
sub-national government revenue. The higher the ratio, 
the more decentralized the country. 
Tax Revenue** SNG tax revenue/SNG total 
revenue 
 
Sub-national government tax revenue as a percentage 
of total sub-national revenue. The higher the ratio, the 
more decentralized the country. 
Revenue 
Assignment**  
SNG revenue/ total 
government revenue 
Sub-national government revenue as a percentage of 
total government revenue. The higher the ratio, the 






Sub-national government expenditure as a percentage 
of total government expenditure. The higher the ratio, 
the more decentralized the country. 
Tax Autonomy*** Taxing Power Whether sub-national government has the following 
taxing power: 3-tax base and tax rate; 2-only tax rate; 
1-none. 
Borrowing Power*** Borrowing power 
 
Whether the sub-national government has the power to 
borrow money: 5-market discipline; 4-cooperative 









Is the local official popularly elected? 1 is for yes; 0 is 
for none. 
Is the state official popularly elected? 1 is for yes; 0 is 
for none. 
With the democratization degree as an indicator, from 0 
(least democratized) to 10 (most democratized). 
Hard Budget 
Constraint 
SNG borrowing activities 
guarantee 
Does the national government explicitly or implicitly 
guarantee the borrowing activity of sub-national 
government: 3-no; 2-implicitly; 1-explicitly. 
*Source: Treisman (2000b)   
**Source: IMF GFS Yearbook (2005) 
***Source: World Bank (2004) www1.worldbank.org/publicsector/decentralization/data.htm  
****Source: Marshall et. al (2000) Polity IV Project. 
 
    While these components and variables are ideal, not every one of them is 
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feasible.  Among these variables, the “ratio” variables, such as SNG tax revenue over 
SNG total revenue, are easily available.  They are also credible because they can be 
directly derived from GFS data published by the IMF.  As for the “institution” variable, 
such as supranational government, federal or unitary state, taxing power, and borrowing 
power, they are also available from websites and the World Bank database.   
  Other variables, however, do suffer from problems relating to objectivity or 
credibility, or both.  For instance, the hard budget constraint, with the proxy variable of 
SNG borrowing activity guaranteed, is controversial.  The controversy lies in the source 
of the variable which comes from the OECD website which provides survey questions for 
countries all over the world.  There are two main problems here.  First, to date, only 40 
countries have responded to the survey questions.  Among the 40 respondents, some did 
not answer all the survey questions.  Therefore, the data samples are incomplete and 
therefore insufficient.   
  Additionally, the survey questions, usually answered by the finance department of 
the respective country, may not be consistent with the objective criteria.  For instance, 
the question, “Does the national government explicitly or implicitly guarantee the 
borrowing activity of sub-national governments,” may elicit different answers from 
different institutions or individuals.  Some may regard the country as explicitly 
guaranteeing the borrowing activity of the sub-national government while others may 
take the viewpoint that the borrowing activity is not guaranteed.  Consequently, the 
credibility of the variable source may be problematic. Although the hard budget 
constraint is considered essential to the success of fiscal decentralization systems, the 




III. Cases and data 
  The research applies cluster analysis to decentralization data collected from 54 
countries for the most recent year available.  The data include fiscal indicators from 
Government Financial Statistics Yearbook (GFS) published by the IMF.  The qualitative 
decentralization data are derived from the World Bank website.  Other data have been 
obtained from the Database of Political Indicators collected by the World Bank and the 
Government of Switzerland.  Several missing data were filled in based on information 
found on the websites of different countries.  The details of the data sources are depicted 
in the following paragraphs. 
  For the Supranational Government component, the variable refers primarily to 
whether the country is a member of the EU or not, with the dummy value of 1 and 0.  
The variable can be collected easily from the official website of the EU. 
  For the Political Structure component, two variables are assigned, including 
federal state or not, and numbers of tiers of government.  The first variable can be 
readily found on the EU website, with the dummy values of 1 and 0.  The second 
variable, numbers of tiers of government, can be obtained from decentralization 
indicators constructed by Daniel Treisman, Associate Professor of Political Science at the 
University of California, Los Angeles.  The value of this variable ranges from 2 (the 
lowest) to 5 (the highest).   
  To quantify the Transfer Revenue component, we used sub-national government 
transfer revenue as a percentage of total sub-national government revenue.  The average 
figure derived from the most recent four years of data is calculated to prevent possible 
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distortions arising from spikes in transfer revenue during a given one-year period.  To 
simplify the data variations, the ratio figure is further classified into different categories.  
For instance, the ratio of 10% or below is categorized as 1, transfer ratio figures between 
11% and 20% are categorized as 2, and so on.  The highest level of ratio is 9, which 
means the transfer revenue of the sub-national government accounts for more than 80% 
of the total revenue of the sub-national government.  The major reason for transforming 
numerical data into categorical data is that we assume the existence of a non-linear 
relationship among these continuous data.   Therefore, categorical variables would 
allow for more to capture non-linearities in the variable.  A linear single continuous 
variable presentation is not going to capture these variations.  In addition, we want to 
tabulate two different formatted variables, e.g. taxing power and revenue assignment, one 
in the format of continuous data and the other in the format of categorical.  We would 
derive cross tabulation results with 3 columns and a large number of rows.  This is 
clearly not the best approach for displaying the statistical data.  Therefore, based on the 
foregoing arguments, we transform the numerical data into categorical data. 
  Potentially, there are problems of over-diversification in this format.  For 
example, countries with a transfer ratio of 10% and 11% may be placed differently in 
category 1 and 2.  This situation is rare in our data set and would not impact the results 
of our cluster analysis unless there were too few categories for these numerical variables.  
This explains the reasoning behind transforming the variable value in Tax Revenue and 
Revenue and Expenditure Assignment components.    
  In the Tax Revenue component, the variable that is assigned is the sub-national 
government’s tax revenue as a percentage of the sub-national government’s total revenue.  
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As with the calculation of the intergovernmental transfer revenue variable, the average 
figure derived from the most recent four years’ data is employed and based on the same 
rationale.  After the calculation of the four-year average figure, the scale of 1 to 9 is 
assigned to each country’s level.   
  In the Revenue and Expenditure Assignment components, sub-national 
government revenue/expenditure as a percentage of total government 
revenue/expenditure is used to capture the dimension.  The calculation is similar to that 
of intergovernmental transfer and tax revenue where the four-year average figure is 
calculated and scales assigned.  However, there is a slight difference in the scales of the 
revenue/expenditure assignment variable.  The scale ranges from 1 to 5 with category 5 
being the ratio of 41% and above.  
  For the Tax Autonomy component, the types of taxing power the sub-national 
government possesses will be demonstrated.  The types of taxing power employed are 
three, as identified by the World Bank: 3 - adjusting tax base and tax rate; 2 – the tax rate 
only; 1 - none.   
  The Borrowing Power component depicts the types of borrowing power that 
sub-national governments possess; the World Bank has identified five of them as follows:  
5 - market discipline; 4 - cooperative control; 3 - administrative control; 2 – rule-based 
control; 1 - borrowing prohibited.   
  Finally, in the Political Decentralization component, three variables were 
intended for use.  However, the variable for state and municipal elections is problematic 
in terms of cluster analysis due to the number of missing values in this category.  The 
DPI (Database on Political Institutions) database includes incomplete and obsolete data 
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on state and municipal elections worldwide.  The latest data are from 1997, too old to be 
used in the analysis for this dissertation.  Moreover, there are countries which do not 
have state-level government, a circumstance which makes it impossible to capture the 
state election variable for this dimension.   
  The second argument against the use of state or municipal elections variable is 
that some countries may have locally elected officials, but actual executive power is 
arrogated by the local assembly, which could be either appointive or locally elected.  
This means that 8 different kinds of political decentralization are possible, (executive v. 
assembly) and (elected v. appointed) and (real power v. puppet).  In the latter 
circumstance, the locally elected official may in reality be nothing more than a figurehead 
in local affairs, undermining the concept of decentralization because the de jure elected 
official does not actually have the power normally associated with elected office.   
  The DPI has been criticized not only for its simplicity, but also for lacking 
credibility.  Here, we reserve skepticism about the credibility of the dataset, due to the 
fact that the level of political decentralization in some countries is not adequately 
captured in the database.  As an example, China, coded PRC in DPI, has been 
categorized as a state having elected governors in the database.  China, however, 
remains an authoritarian state under which all vestiges of political power are controlled 
by a single party.  This is in direct opposition to the concept of a de facto locally elected 
official.  Moreover, if there were a locally-elected governor, he or she would be only a 
nominal leader, acting as an agent of the central government.  It is logical to conclude, 
therefore, that the dimension of political decentralization is particularly complicated and 
difficult to measure in a single variable based on the current database.  
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  A possible alternative for measuring political decentralization would be using a 
credible proxy variable, that of democratization, which is more complete, accurate, and 
usable, to capture the dimension of political decentralization.  Currently, the most 
credible data source for this variable is from Polity IV, collected by the University of 
Maryland.  Critics of this approach may contend that the relationship between 
democratization and political decentralization is problematic.  The question is whether 
the democratization variable is adequate to capture the dimension of political 
decentralization.  We find that democratization is positively correlated with political 
decentralization.  The broadening of democratization results in an environment where 
the local official or assembly may accrue more freedom and breadth of power. Aside from 
the correlation arguments, the spirit of fiscal decentralization may also play a significant 
part in justifying the use of the democratization indicator.  A major element of 
decentralization is that it is local governments who can best respond to the needs of the 
jurisdictional people. Consequently, a more democratized country would allow its people 
the freedom of speech, while a less-democratized nation would attempt to restrain speech.  
It is a straightforward conclusion that a more democratized country will, by definition, be 
more decentralized.  
  The Polity IV database is panel data covering the period from 1800 to 2002, and 
represents countries worldwide.  This database divided countries into 11 categories, 
from 0 (the least democratized) to 10 (the most democratized).  In our analysis,data was 
extracted from the most recent year available, 2002 democratization, as an indicator for 
political decentralization.   
  As a result of the abovementioned arguments and examples, we summarized the 
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variable code and components for cluster analysis as follows: 
1. Supra-national Government: supranational government (SUPRA),  
2. Political Structure: federal state (FED); numbers of tiers of government (NUM) 
3. Transfer Revenue: SNG transfer revenue/SNG total revenue (TRANS) 
4. Tax Revenue: SNG tax revenue/SNG total revenue (TR) 
5. Revenue Assignment: SNG total revenue/total government revenue (REV) 
6. Expenditure Assignment: SNG total expenditure/total government expenditure (EXP) 
7. Tax Autonomy: types of taxing power (TP) 
8. Borrowing Power: types of borrowing power (BP) 
9. Political Decentralization: democratization indicator (DEMO) 
There are 9 components and 10 variables for cluster analysis.  Among the 10 variables, 
TRANS and TR are highly correlated.  One of them must be eliminated, leaving 9 
variables to be used for cluster analysis in the following section. 
 
IV. Clustering countries by components of a fiscal decentralization system 
  In this section, the cluster analysis method is employed to group countries with 
similar fiscal decentralization systems and characteristics together.  Lorr (1983) 
stipulates that cluster analysis refers to the technique used to group entities into 
homogeneous subgroups on the basis of their similarities across several observed 
characteristics.  In a more precise way, we can say that cluster analysis enables us to 
partition a data set into subsets (cluster), so that the data in each subset ideally share some 
common traits.  Cluster analysis is widely used in the field of medical science 
(Aldenderfer & Blashfield, 1984).  For example, Goldstein & Linden (1969), two 
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clinical psychologists, used cluster analysis to build a classification of alcoholics.  In the 
application of social science, cluster analysis is also popular in the field of marketing, 
archaeology, and education as well (Bartholomew et. al. 2002).  These studies usually 
involve coping with partitioning data sets into mutually exclusive subsets.  Our research 
regards fiscal decentralization as a system composed of different components (as 
measured by several variables); cluster analysis is thus a useful as well as feasible way of 
identifying a typology of fiscal decentralization systems.   
  Plentiful literature regarding the application of cluster analysis in social science, 
particularly in economics, is recognized.  Some economists attempt to interpret the 
economic reform in transition economies using cluster analysis (Dabrowski 1996, Zinnes, 
Sachs, and Eilat 2000).  Dabrowski (1996) clustered the transition economies based on a 
country’s policy orientation, primarily on three aspects: the speed of action, the 
comprehensiveness and consistency of policy, and cumulative progress.   
  Arguing against these approaches to cluster analysis, Zinnes, Sachs, and Eilat 
(2001), on the other hand, clustered these transition economies based on their initial 
conditions.  There are 12 categories of initial conditions identified in their analysis: 
Physical geography, macroeconomics variables, demographics/health, infrastructure, 
industrialization, wealth, human capital, market memory, physical capital, culture, and 
political conditions.  This seems to be the most complete and appropriate approach for 
investigating the economic pattern of these transition economies, enabling the cluster of 
these countries. 
  Aside from economic patterns of transitional economies, cluster analysis is used 
to study the fishery industries of developing countries.  Zinnes (1987) depicted a 
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framework for fishery industries in developing countries by recognizing nine components.  
Each component was assigned several variables to capture the dimension.  The cluster 
analysis categorized the 64 countries into 10 groups based on their development pattern.  
This research proves instructive in that the typology is able to distinguish the 
least-favored type of fishery industry, which is rare in policy analysis. 
  All the aforementioned studies provided inspiration for this dissertation.  Cluster 
analysis, however, has never been used heretofore in a study of fiscal decentralization.  
As the first to apply cluster analysis to the topic of fiscal decentralization, we attempt 
here to determine the parameters of the least-favored fiscal decentralization system, as 
well as the most advantageous system. 
  As discussed in the previous section, the use of cluster analysis allows us to 
identify the underlying issues in an economical way that merely assessing cross-country 
fiscal decentralization systems could do.  In this dissertation, we employ two types of 
cluster analysis—clusters based on means and clusters based on medians.  The basic 
operation of the cluster kmeans and kmedians is relatively simple: given a fixed number 
of (desired or hypothesized) k clusters, assign observations to those clusters so that the 
means or medians across clusters (for all variables) are as different from each other as 
possible.  In other words, cluster analysis seeks to identify a set of groups which both 
minimize within-group variations and maximize between-group variations.   
      In this dissertation, both cluster means and cluster medians are used to categorize 
the 54 countries into k groups with k ranging from 5 to 10.  The results of all our cluster 
analysis are included in Appendix I, for kmeans, and Appendix II, for kmedians.  In both 
cases, we run the cluster analysis with nine selected variables.  These variables include 
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SUPRA (the existence or non-existence of supra-national government), FED (federal 
state or not), NUM (numbers of tiers of SNG), TR (SNG tax revenue/SNG total revenue), 
REV (revenue assignment), EXP (expenditure assignment), TP (taxing power), BP 
(borrowing power), and DEMO (political decentralization).  Limitations exist in this 
cluster analysis, as suggested by Lorr (1983), in that the number of clusters is smaller 
than the number of variables used to identify clusters.  We thus empirically rule out the 
possibility of grouping countries into 9 or more clusters. As a result of these self-imposed 
limitations, the cluster classifications range from 5 to 9 groups.  
   The determination of the numbers of cluster analysis is a fundamental problem yet 
unsolved due to the lack of an appropriate null hypothesis as well as to the complex 
nature of multivariate sampling distributions (Everitt, 1979).  Despite endeavoring to 
justify the determination of the number of clusters, many of them remain heuristically 
understood. Aldenderfer & Balshfield (1984) indicate two basic approaches to 
determining the number of clusters which are present in dendrograms and how they have 
evolved, heuristic procedures and formal tests (the latter are mainly the examination of 
the values of fusion coefficients).  STATA (2003) also suggests the solutions of Calinski 
& Harabasz pseudo-F index, which is a stopping-rule value computed for each cluster 
solution. Larger values indicate more distinct clustering.  
      In this dissertation, we employ the Calinski & Harabasz pseudo-F test suggested 
by STATA (2003).  This test is used to determine the distinction of each cluster number, 
a useful way to determine the appropriate number of clusters.  In table 3.4, we find that 
the five-group solution with pseudo-F value of 27.78 is the largest, indicating that the 
five-group solution is the most distinctive, compared with other group solutions.  It has 
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been determined that five types of fiscal decentralization systems would be insufficient to 
reflect the multi-dimensions of fiscal decentralization systems.  The second largest 
pseudo-F, six- group solutions were therefore employed.  The expectation is that 54 
countries will be the most similar within cluster and the most different inter cluster.  
Table 3.6 displays the mean and the standard deviation for each cluster on nine variables 
employed to delineate each fiscal decentralization cluster. 
Table 3.4: Calinski/Harabasz pseudo-F test for each number of clusters 
Number of cluster 
(median) 
C/H pseudo-F Number of cluster 
(mean) 
C/H pseudo-F 
5 23.51 5 27.78 
6 24.33 6 24.00 
7 24.06 7 23.69 
8 17.93 8 20.58 
9 20.33 9 16.35 
 
  Analysis of the application of the above-mentioned method suggests that 
clustering the countries into six groups, which results in six types of fiscal 
decentralization systems, is the most appropriate.  Each type of fiscal decentralization 
system contains nine variables, including the mean value and the standard deviation.  
With the mean and the standard deviation, we can standardize the variables value 
(convert to mean zero and variance one) of each cluster.  The method of standardization 
enables us to distinguish inter-cluster differences.   
  Each cluster is assigned a name based on the standardized value of variables, 
which is the distinct character of the cluster.  If there is no distinguishing value for the 
variable, the cluster may be named according to the countries included in it.  A brief 
description and list of country members for each cluster is provided before discussing the 




Table 3.5: Summary of six types of fiscal decentralization systems (FDS) 
Cluster name Country member 
High Expenditure/Revenue 
assignment FDS (HERA) 
Austria, Bolivia, Brazil, Germany, India, Italy, 
Korea, Mexico, Mongolia, Norway, Poland, Russia, 
Spain, Taiwan 
Low Expenditure/Revenue 
assignment FDS (LERA) 
Belgium, Czech Republic, France, New Zealand, 
Portugal 
Revenue transfer FDS (TRAN) Albania, Guatemala, Hungary, Indonesia, 
Netherlands, Peru, South Africa, United Kingdom 
Most complete FDS (COMP) Argentina, Australia, Canada, Demark, Japan, 
Finland, Sweden, Switzerland, United States 
Politically centralized FDS 
(POCL) 
Azerbaijan, Belarus, China, Kazakhstan, 
Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan 
Unitary State FDS (UNIS) Bulgaria, Croatia, Estonia, Georgia, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Nicaragua, Romania, Thailand, Ukraine, 
Colombia, Costa Rica 
 
  High-Expenditure/Revenue Assignment FDS (HERA): includes Austria, 
Bolivia, Brazil, Germany, India, Italy, Korea, Mexico, Mongolia, Norway, Poland, Russia, 
Spain, and Taiwan.  HERA FDS demonstrates a robust expenditure and revenue 
assignment.  In terms of traditional fiscal decentralization indicators, the countries in 
this group would be regarded as the most decentralized.  However, in the new 
measurements of fiscal decentralization, HERA FDS lacks qualitative fiscal 
decentralization including: taxing power, taxing revenue, and borrowing power.  
  Low-Expenditure/Revenue Assignment FDS (LERA): includes Belgium, 
Czech Republic, France, New Zealand, and Portugal.  The countries in this cluster 
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display a strong similarity in the variable of supra-government structure which indicates 
that, except New Zealand, they are regulated by the EU government.  It should be noted 
that LERA FDS has the lowest score on the variable of expenditure/revenue assignment.  
The possible explanation for this phenomenon is the 3% ceiling on budget deficits that is 
imposed on these countries.  As a result, the national government is more frugal in local 
spending, fearing that irresponsible spending behavior by a sub-national government 
could increase the national deficit.  Additionally, LERA FDS possess a relatively benign 
taxing power, along with generous borrowing power.   
  Revenue Transfer FDS (TRAN): includes Albania, Guatemala, Hungary, 
Indonesia, Netherlands, Peru, South Africa, and the United Kingdom.  TRAN FDS 
exhibited a very discernible low level of tax revenue.  Previously, we have mentioned 
that the variables of tax revenue and transfer revenue are inversely correlated.  
Therefore, a low level of tax revenue is equivalent to a high level of transfer revenue 
from the national government.  This explains why the group is named transfer revenue 
FDS.  In addition to the conspicuously low ratio of tax revenue, some indicators also 
exhibited relatively poor taxing power and borrowing power.  
  Most Complete FDS (COMP): includes Argentina, Australia, Canada, Denmark, 
Japan, Finland, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United States.  COMP FDS demonstrate 
very strong similarities among its member countries.  This group is mainly composed of 
the world’s most developed countries, with the exception of Argentina.  A possible 
explanation for the inclusion of Argentina is that the financial crisis in this country is 
primarily generated from undisciplined spending behavior by the sub-national 
government and this cluster analysis does not include the hard budget constraint variable 
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over the local government, due to the lack of credible data sources.  It should also be 
noted that countries in this cluster present high scores on almost all the variables.  The 
sub-national governments in this group possess a high degree of taxing revenue, taxing 
power, borrowing power, expenditure/revenue assignment and independence in local 
affairs.  All these characteristics are consistent with the desirable framework for the 
fiscal decentralization system proposed by Bahl and Martinez-Vazquez (2005).  
Therefore, the cluster is considered the most complete FDS.  
  Politically Centralized FDS (POCL): includes Azerbaijan, Belarus, China, 
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan.  Contrary to the COMP FDS, POCL FDS is 
composed of developing countries, without exception.  Although the sub-national 
governments in this group enjoys a high degree of tax revenue and expenditure/revenue 
assignment, their taxing and borrowing powers are actually quite constricted.  The 
sub-national governments here are likely to play the role of agents of the central 
government rather than possessing independent discretionary powers to deal with local 
affairs.  This argument can also be supported by their lowest scores on the democracy 
variable, which reflects their extremely limited political decentralization.  To summarize, 
the countries in this cluster have a high enough number of unfavorable institutional 
arrangements in political decentralization to be described as  politically centralized 
fiscal decentralization systems.  
  Unitary State FDS (UNIS): includes Bulgaria, Croatia, Estonia, Georgia, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Nicaragua, Romania, Thailand, Ukraine, Colombia, and Costa Rica.  None of 
the countries in UNIS FDS is a federal state, which suggests that all of them are a unitary 
state.  UNIS FDS also assign little taxing power and borrowing power to their 
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sub-national governments.  The sub-national governments in this cluster also enjoy 
limited local independence as well as expenditure/revenue assignment.  One 
distinguished institutional arrangement for this type of system is the high level of tax 
revenue.  In many ways, UNIS FDS bears a striking resemblance to POCL FDS: a 
non-federal state, with limited taxing and borrowing powers, a low level of political 
decentralization, and a high ratio of tax revenue in the SNG.  Yet the relatively high 
degree of political decentralization puts these countries in the cluster of UNIS FDS.  In 
addition to the similarity in fiscal decentralization systems, one should take note that the 
POCL FDS and UNIS FDS are mostly composed of the countries of the former Soviet 
Union and Eastern Europe Communist Bloc.   
   
V. Limitation of Cluster Analysis 
  It should be noted that no single typology can perfectly describe and categorize all 
countries’ fiscal decentralization systems.  Therefore, it is necessary to identify the 
problematic countries where there is controversy regarding their placement in a 
designated cluster.  The controversial placement may result from either the timeliness 
and accessibility of datasets or the incomplete performance of a single indicator.  For 
example, the placement of Argentina in the most complete FDS is controversial due to 
that country’s well-known fiscal problems which arose from inadequate fiscal discipline 
in the sub-national government.  Nevertheless, owing to the lack of a proxy variable for 
the hard budget constraint on sub-national government borrowing, it would be hard to 
exhibit the effects of this component on fiscal decentralization systems.  Under this 
circumstance, Argentina would still be placed in the most complete FDS, considering its 
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quantitative fiscal decentralization indicators as well as the qualitative fiscal 
decentralization indicators.  Taking China as another example, this country has made 
progress in its decentralization efforts.  However, considering the fact that China is still 
acting as an authoritarian state, independence for local officials is still highly constrained.  
It can, therefore, be placed in POCL FDS.  The relevant information is displayed in 
Table 3.5 as follows. 
  Another difficulty of cluster analysis is the determination of the number of 
clusters.  Everitt (1979) regards this fundamental step as among the as yet unsolved 
problems of cluster analysis.  He argues that the two most important reasons that little 
progress has been made toward a solution are the lack of a suitable null hypothesis as 
well as the complex nature of multivariate sampling distributions.  Even though some 
tests are proposed to justify the number of clusters, most of these methods are poorly 
understood or are heuristics (Aldenderfer & Blashfield).  As a result, without a proper 




Table 3.6: Controversial countries in each cluster 
Cluster Countries member Least-fitting 
countries 
High-Expenditure/Revenue 
Assignment FDS (HERA) 
Austria, Bolivia, Brazil, Germany, India, 
Italy, Korea, Mexico, Mongolia, Norway, 




Assignment FDS (LERA) 
Belgium, Czech, France, New Zealand, 
Portugal 
 
Revenue Transfer FDS 
(TRAN) 
Albania, Guatemala, Hungary, Indonesia, 
Netherlands, Peru, South Africa, UK 
UK, 
Netherlands 
Most Complete FDS 
(COMP) 
Argentina, Australia, Canada, Denmark, 




Azerbaijan, Belarus, China, Kazakhstan, 
Kyrgyz, Tajikistan,  
China 
 
Unitary State FDS (UNIS) 
Bulgaria, Croatia, Estonia, Georgia, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Nicaragua, Romania, 











Table 3.7: Cluster means and standard deviations of FDS 































































































































*The value in the parenthesis is standard deviation. 
HERA FDS (High Expenditure/Revenue Assignment) 
LERA FDS (Low Expenditure/Revenue Assignment) 
TRAN FDS (Transfer Revenue) 
COMP FDS (Most Complete) 
POCL FDS (Politically Centralized) 
UNIS FDS (Unitary State)
 






















































































































































































Chapter IV: Inter- and intra-cluster comparison  
 
   In the previous chapter, six types of fiscal decentralization systems were identified 
that are currently implemented in countries worldwide.  This chapter explores how 
different types of fiscal decentralization systems perform through comparison of several 
performance indicators among the six identified clusters.   
 
I. Inter-cluster comparison 
      Several performance indicators will be used to compare each cluster’s strengths 
and weaknesses.  The inter-cluster comparison enables us to take a broad view of the six 
types of fiscal decentralization systems.  First, three kinds of performance dimensions 
were employed, specifically, economic performance, governance performance and fiscal 
performance.  Each performance is analyzed using two sub-indicators.  In studying the 
economic performance, the two sub-indicators used for comparison were annual GDP 
growth rate and the rate of inflation.  Also included is the GDP per capita (PPP) as one 
of the sub-indicators of economic performance; this was included because of the rapid 
rate of growth in emerging markets during this period.   In governance performance, an 
index of corruption and an index of government effectiveness are employed to compare 
six types of fiscal decentralization systems.  In the area of fiscal performance, 
government debt figures and fiscal deficit statistics are utilized in the comparison.  All 
performance indicators contain time-series data from 1996 to 2004, depending on the 
availability of datasets.  The year range chosen was primarily because the data for 
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institutional arrangements of fiscal decentralization systems were usually collected 
during this time period.  Consequently, the performance data during this collection 
period may prove to be closely associated with the institutional arrangements of fiscal 
decentralization systems.  However, on the inter-cluster economic performance 
comparison, we extend the data back to early 1990s to avoid the extreme volatility of 
economic performance in emerging markets.  
Table 4.1: Contents of performance indicator 
Performance Indicator Source 
GDP growth rate World Economic Outlook Database, IMF 
Inflation rate World Economic Outlook Database, IMF 
Economic performance 
GDP per capita, PPP (LOI) World Economic Outlook Database, IMF 
Corruption index Governance III 2002 Governance performance 
Government Effectiveness  Governance III 2002 
Government debt/GDP OECD; CIA World Factbook Fiscal performance 
Fiscal deficit/GDP World Development Indicators, World Bank 
OECD website 
         
   These seven performance indicators were chosen based primarily on previous 
empirical studies investigating the relationship between fiscal decentralization and its 
relevant performance.  For example, previous studies have attempted to find a 
relationship between GDP growth and fiscal decentralization, while others have tried to 
identify the relationship between governance and fiscal decentralization.  These 
empirical studies remain inconclusive; however, these studies capture a snapshot of the 
relevance of fiscal decentralization.  In addition, we conduct pairwise correlations in 
STATA on these performance variables to determine how they are correlated.  The 
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results are presented in table 4.2.  Based on the time series data from 1996 to 2004, the 
variable of income level is highly correlated with government effectiveness and 
corruption control.  Further, the variable of GDP growth rate is inversely correlated with 
governance performance and fiscal performance. 
Table 4.2: Pairwise correlation for performance variables 
 GDP Inflation INC* Effect Corrupt Deficit Debt 
GDP 1.000 
 
      
Inflation 0.268 
(0.05) 














































*INC: level of income, GDP per capita (PPP) 
Value in parenthesis is the t-test probability for the null hypothesis that each individual correlation equals 
zero. 
 
A. Economic Performance 
    Three economic performance indicators are assigned in this category: GDP 
growth rate, inflation rate, and GDP per capita (PPP).  The time series data range from 
1990 to 2005.  The data for these three indicators are less controversial than others 
because the definition is widely accepted.  They are readily available from World 
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Economic Outlook Database created by IMF.   
   In terms of GDP growth rate, POCL FDS and UNIS FDS exhibit the most volatile 
GDP growth rate during this time period (figure 4.1).  This trend is particularly apparent 
prior to1997.  It should be noted that countries in POCL FDS expedite their GDP growth 
rate after 1997.  Furthermore, COMP FDS displays the steadiest economic performance 
during this time period.  This is explained by noting that cluster 4 is composed primarily 
of industrialized countries, which usually exhibit slow but steady economic growth.  
LERA FDS, with the similar composition of countries as COMP FDS, demonstrates this 
same economic growth pattern.   
      Analysis of data back to the early 1990s shows the inflation rate has greater 
variation compared to GDP growth rate (figure 4.2).  TRAN FDS, POCL FDS, and 
UNIS FDS all exhibit highly volatile inflation rate patterns during the early 1990s.  
POCL FDS displays the highest inflation rate as well as the most irregular inflation 
pattern during this period.  Volatility, however, steadies after 2000.  LERA FDS and 
COMP FDS, with their slow but steady economic growth, are expected to demonstrate a 
low and regular inflation rate during this period.  HERA FDS, with its intermediate GDP 
growth rate, also display an intermediate inflation rate.   
    In examining GDP per capita performance (figure 4.3), the graph provides 
explanations of the fast growing of GDP growth rate in POCL FDS and UNIS FDS.  
Countries in these clusters are largely states with low levels of income.  Conversely, 
countries in COMP FDS are primarily states with high income levels.  From this it can 
be concluded that the fast paced GDP growth rate is associated with low levels of income 




   Generally speaking, POCL FDS and UNIS FDS exhibit the highest levels of GDP 
growth rates and rates of inflation, while LERA FDS and COMP FDS display the lowest 
levels of GDP growth and inflation rates.  From the perspective of fiscal 
decentralization, the economic performance pattern seems to suggest that well-designed 
institutional arrangements for a fiscally decentralized system do not necessarily help in 
stimulating GDP growth but it does appear to offer some support in holding the inflation 
at stable levels.   
 
B. Governance Performance 
      Two indicators of governance performance are examined in this category: the 
corruption indicator and the government effectiveness indicator.  These indices are 
chosen from the governance III database.  The governance indicators are measured in 
units ranging from approximately -2.5 to 2.5, with the higher values corresponding to 
better governance outcomes.  Governance III provides time series data across countries 
worldwide (Kaufmann et. al. 2003).  The time span ranges from 1996 to 2004, in a 
format using bi-annual data.   
      There are six governance indicators in the governance III database.  Corruption 
and government effectiveness indicators are chosen because previous empirical studies 
have investigated their relationship with fiscal decentralization (Huther & Shah 1998; 
Fishman & Gatti 2000; DeMello & Barenstein 2001; Gurgur & Shah 2002;).  For 
example, Fishman & Gatti (2000) and Gurgur & Shah (2002) all agree on the inverse 
association between fiscal decentralization and corruption.  They find that higher 
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degrees of fiscal decentralization yield lower levels of corruption.  Nevertheless, as we 
have argued in the previous chapter, the traditional thinking in fiscal decentralization that 
focuses on the ratio of SNG expenditure/revenue as to total government 
expenditure/revenue is problematic and controversial; it would thus be unable to reflect 
the real correlation between fiscal decentralization and corruption.  As a consequence of 
this argument, this study takes a fiscal decentralization system approach that serves as 
complementary knowledge in this field of research.   
   Another issue regarding the governance dataset collected by Kaufmann et. al. 
(2003) is that the data set is compiled on the basis of polls by experts and of 
cross-country surveys of residents.  In other words, the data set is quite a subjective 
perception of general government rather than of objective differences in institutions 
across countries.  Moreover, the data set does not specify whether this perception falls 
into the category of central government or of local government.  Therefore, in the 
present research, the governance performance is based on the perception of general 
governments of a country.   
      From figure 4.4, we see that COMP FDS has the highest score on government 
effectiveness, followed by LERA FDS.  POCL FDS and UNIS FDS rank the lowest 
among all clusters on government effectiveness.  Figure 4.5, the trend of corruption 
indicator, also depicts a similar pattern.  This result seems to imply a connection 
between a well-designed fiscal decentralization system and governance performance.  In 
the previous literature review section, the empirical studies have suggested consistent 
results in this relationship.  Almost all the empirical results indicated a positive 
relationship between fiscal decentralization and governance performance.   
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C. Fiscal Performance 
   Two major fiscal performance indicators are investigated: fiscal balance and 
government debt performance.  The fiscal balance indicator is utilized by observing the 
central government’s overall budget balance as a percentage of GDP.  The data is 
available from World Development Indicators, published by the World Bank.  All other 
missing data are complemented by other sources, such as the OECD website, and the 
Economist Intelligence Unit.   
   The accessibility of the fiscal balance database is not difficult in light of the fact 
that its simple and clear definitions are commonly accepted.  However, there are 
differences between the fiscal balance of the general government and of the central 
government.  This research employed the data of the central government fiscal balance 
as observed indicators because of the availability of the database.   
   Data on debt performance, on the other hand, is controversial owing to the diverse 
definitions of public debt.  According to Reinhart, Rogoff, and Savastano (2003), debt 
can be defined in four categories.  External debt: the total liabilities of a country with 
foreign creditors, both official (public) and private.  Total government (public) debt: the 
total debt liabilities of a government with both domestic and foreign creditors.  
Government domestic debt: all debt liabilities of a government that are issued under, and 
subject to, national jurisdiction, regardless of the nationality of the creditor. Government 
foreign currency domestic debt: debt liabilities of a government that are issued under 
national jurisdiction but expressed in a currency different from the national currency.  
Among these four definitions, external debt and total government debt are the most 
widely used indicators.  Different kinds of debt may pose different threats to the debtor 
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country.  For example, developing countries are constantly plagued by heavy external 
debt while industrialized nations, usually free from external debt, are swamped with 
national debt, such as Japan and Italy.   
   In addition to inconsistencies in defining government debt, a major obstacle to 
analyzing government debt is the absence of databases.  As in all large sample data 
analysis, the completeness of the data signifies the accuracy and robustness of the 
empirical results.  While an extensive effort has been made to incorporate the most 
complete and respected datasets available, some deficiencies remain.   
   Currently, OECD, the World Bank, and the IMF are working together to establish 
a database of external debt across countries.  However, despite these efforts, only 
external debt for developing countries has been completed.  External debt in 
industrialized countries has yet to be established; therefore, the total government debt 
indicator in the OECD database will be employed as the proxy indicator to compare with 
the external debt in developing countries.  As a result, LERA FDS and COMP FDS in 
figure 4.7 uses a different definition of debt performance.   
   Generally speaking, there are several difficulties in the collection of data on debt 
performance.  While attempts are made to ensure consistency in cross-country data, the 
quality and therefore credibility of data may vary given the variations among database 
sources, as well as the data collection techniques employed by the respective national 
entities, partner agencies, and international organizations.   
   In terms of fiscal balance, it can be seen that LERA FDS and COMP FDS exhibit 
a higher level of performance with respect to their government budget balance.  
Conversely, data reveal deterioration in fiscal balance in HERA FDS.  In HERA FDS, 
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four countries, Brazil, India, Mongolia, and Taiwan, exhibit an average fiscal balance 
over GDP lower than -5% from 1997 to 2001.  Generally speaking, all six clusters 
demonstrate an upward trend, i.e., an improving sign of fiscal balance during this time 
frame.     
      In terms of debt performance, COMP FDS, composed of mostly developed 
countries, exhibits the highest debt level, as expected.  LERA FDS and UNIS FDS, on 
the other hand, also display high levels of debt along with COMP FDS.  HERA FDS and 
TRAN FDS demonstrate the lowest level of debt to GNI among the six clusters.  In 
addition, they also exhibit a downward trend, indicative of lower debt levels.   
   It should be noted that, as previously shown, the debt level in LERA FDS and 
COMP FDS is the measurement of general government debt to GDP while the other four 
clusters are measured by the indicator of external debt to GNI.  Inconsistencies in 
measurements may result in skewed investigations of debt performance among the six 
clusters.  However, in light of the fact that some developed countries may possess zero 
external debt while carrying high levels of government debt, it would be a contingent 
method to use different yet closely related debt measurements among the six clusters.  
Furthermore, LERA FDS and COMP FDS are composed primarily of developed 
countries, which are usually plagued by domestic debt rather than external debt.  A 
measurement of general government debt can more appropriately reflect the debt 
performance of these industrialized countries. 
   Figure 4.7 reveals that COMP FDS exhibits the greatest debt burden, followed by 
LERA FDS and UNIS FDS.  Like the countries in COMP FDS, countries in LERA FDS 
are mainly composed of industrialized nations.  It is not surprising, therefore, to find a 
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high debt burden in these two clusters.  UNIS FDS, on the other hand, is primarily 
composed of the countries formerly within the Soviet Union.  Accordingly, they display 
a similar performance pattern to the countries in POCL FDS.  
 
II. Intra-cluster comparison 
   Intra-cluster comparisons were conducted in order to further distinguish 
within-cluster variations.  These comparisons were based on indicators of previous 
performance as presented in the inter-cluster comparison, with the exception that the debt 
performance graph was excluded as the many missing variables cast doubt on the 
reliability of the conclusions drawn from findings in this category.  Intra-cluster 
comparisons convey at glance information about center, spread, and outliers among six 
clusters.  Methodology for the intra-cluster comparison utilized the calculation of the 
average figures of GDP, inflation, government effectiveness, corruption levels, and fiscal 
balance over a 5-7 year period for each country.  The box plot was then drawn to display 
the distribution of countries within each cluster.  
 
A. Economic Performance 
   Figure 4.8 displays variations in the growth rate of GDP in six clusters.  There 
are two outliers in HERA FDS and POCL FDS.  In HERA FDS, Russia does not align 
with the rest of the countries, while China is completely different from the remaining 
countries in POCL FDS in terms of GDP growth rate.  Countries in LERA FDS exhibit 
the most consistency in GDP growth rate, while the countries in UNIS FDS exhibit the 
most variability.  Additionally, the median proportion of GDP growth rate tends to be 
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highest in COMP FDS, and lowest in POCL FDS.  
   With respect to the inflation rate, there is evidence of tighter clustering.  There 
are huge variations in the inflation rate across the six clusters.  There are outliers in 
COMP FDS.  Two outliers are found in COMP FDS.  Argentina exhibits the highest 
inflation rate when compared to the rest of the countries in COMP FDS.  Japan, on the 
other hand, displays a deflationary trend in COMP FDS.  Among the six clusters, POCL 
FDS conveys the greatest degree of variability in the rate of distribution of inflation.   
      The intra-cluster comparison in GDP per capita indicates the highest level in 
COMP FDS among the six types of FDS.  Nevertheless, there are two outliers in this 
COMP FDS, which are US and Argentina respectively.  Meanwhile, HERA FDS and 
TRAN FDS both exhibit the most variable distributions in the comparison of income 
level.   
 
B. Governance Performance 
   The intra-cluster comparison in government effectiveness and corruption seems to 
display the same box pattern.  With respect to government effectiveness, COMP FDS 
exhibits the most consistency and the highest median value among the six clusters, with 
the exception of Argentina which has the lowest score in government effectiveness.  
Japan (lower score) and Switzerland (higher score) also play the roles of outlier in COMP 
FDS in terms of government effectiveness.  POCL FDS, on the other hand, has the 
lowest median value, with the exception of China.  China is the only country with a 
positive score for government effectiveness in POCL FDS.  Countries in HERA FDS 
and TRAN FDS exhibit the most variable distributions. 
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   The intra-cluster comparison in corruption conveys the same distributions as in 
government effectiveness.  For instance, COMP FDS still has the highest median value 
while POCL FDS has the lowest median value in corruption index.  LERA FDS, 
however, rather than COMP FDS, exhibits the most consistency.  Again, Argentina does 
not fit in well with the other countries in COMP FDS in terms of the corruption index.  
Two outliers, Czech Republic and New Zealand are also found in LERA FDS.  Costa 
Rica, with the highest score in the corruption index, is the outlier in UNIS FDS.  
 
C. Fiscal Performance 
   In terms of fiscal deficit performance, the data reflect consistency across the six 
clusters.  They have roughly the same median value, with the countries in COMP FDS 
displaying a slightly higher fiscal surplus.  New Zealand, again, is the only country to 
exhibit a fiscal surplus in LERA FDS.  Albania (TRAN FDS) and Japan (COMP FDS) 
are both outliers, exhibiting the worst fiscal deficit while Bulgaria (UNIS FDS) is the best 
fiscal surplus outlier.   
   As for debt performance, POCL FDS demonstrates the most variations, ranging 
from Belarus (7.14%) to Kyrgyzstan (123.92%).  Nicaragua (184.64%) is an extreme 
outlier in UNIS FDS.  Countries in LERA FDS and COMP FDS both display higher 
than average median values, which is consistent with findings that industrialized 
countries are plagued by national debt.   
      Based on the abovementioned analysis, we can then create a table for the outlier 





Table 4.3: Outlier country in each performance comparison 
Performance Outlier country in each cluster 
GDP growth rate HERA FDS: Russia 
POCL FDS: China 
Inflation rate COMP FDS: Argentina, Japan 
GDP per capita, PPP COMP FDS: Argentina, US 
Government Effectiveness COMP FDS: Argentina, Japan, Switzerland 
POCL FDS: China 
Corruption control LERA FDS: Czech, New Zealand 
COMP FDS: Argentina 
UNIS FDS: Costa Rica 
Fiscal balance LERA FDS: New Zealand 
TRAN FDS: UK 
COMP FDS: Japan 
UNIS FDS: Bulgaria 
Debt performance LERA FDS: Belgium 
COMP FDS: Japan 
UNIS FDS: Nicaragua 
 
      Even though we have identified the outlier country in each cluster, we still 
concern with the possibility of one single country may drive the behavior of the cluster.  
This situation is particularly possible in inter-cluster comparison.  As a result, we would 
recommend a more thorough and complete outlier analysis in the future research.   
 
III. Preliminary findings 
   Countries in POCL have high performance indicators of GDP growth rate and the 
inflation rate.  It can be contended, however, that the high GDP growth rate may be 
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associated with low levels of income.  These countries also indicate a lowered quality of 
government effectiveness and corruption.  On the other hand, countries in COMP FDS, 
display totally different patterns.  They have the steadiest performance in GDP growth 
rate, and the highest level of debt-to-GDP ratio.  These countries also have the best 
performance on inflation control, government effectiveness, the corruption index, and 
fiscal balance.   
   Contrary to the commonly accepted notion that fiscal decentralization can 
facilitate or otherwise promote economic growth, the present findings suggest that even 
the most complete FDS would not necessarily exhibit the best GDP growth; however, the 
proffered relationship still needs further empirical experiments to conclusively prove or 
disprove.  Meanwhile, a well-designed FDS, e.g., the COMP FDS, indicates better 
governance performance, consistent with the results of most empirical studies.   
   As for the countries in HERA FDS and TRAN FDS, their performance is the most 
average among six clusters.  That is, these countries are neither the best nor the worst in 
their performance with respect to GDP growth rate, inflation rate, government 
effectiveness and corruption indicators.   
   Like the countries in POCL FDS, countries in UNIS FDS demonstrate the same 
tendency in several performance indicators.  For example, they tend to exhibit both high 
GDP growth rates as well as high inflation rates.  They also display worse levels of 
performance with regard to government effectiveness and corruption indicators, but rate 
slightly better than countries in POCL FDS.   
   The relationship between countries in LERA FDS and COMP FDS is identical to 
that in the countries of POCL FDS and UNIS FDS.  Countries in LERA FDS also 
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developed a similar performance pattern as the countries in COMP FDS, such as lower 
levels of GDP growth rate and the inflation rate and better performance on governance 
indicators.  There are several explanations for this phenomenon.  In addition to the 
similar composition of member countries, which are mostly industrialized, LERA FDS 
and COMP FDS display one commonality.  Both types have higher scores in the 
variables of qualitative dimensions of fiscal decentralization, such as taxing power, 
borrowing power, and political decentralization.  In brief, the relationship between the 
qualitative dimensions of fiscal decentralization and all other performance indicators 
would require a further empirical model to either prove or disprove, which will be 




















TRAN: Revenue Transfer FDS                    UNIS: Unitary State FDS   
LERA: Low Expenditure/Revenue Assignment FDS   POCL: Politically Centralized FDS 
HERA: High Expenditure/Revenue Assignment FDS  COMP: Most Complete FDS 

































































































































































































































































HERA LERA TRAN COMP POCL UNIS
Figure 4.9: Intra-cluster comparison in inflation rate 
 
 















HERA LERA TRAN COMP POCL UNIS
Figure 4.11: Intra-cluster comparison in government effectiveness 
 
 















HERA LERA TRAN COMP POCL UNIS
Figure 4.13: Intra-cluster comparison on deficit (% of GDP) 
 
 










Chapter V: Empirical model 
 
   The previous chapter focused on preliminary observations regarding the 
relationship between different types of fiscal decentralization systems and several 
indicators of performance by employing the inter- and intra-cluster comparison method. 
This method revealed a deficit with regard to inter-cluster comparisons which provide an 
insufficient analysis of the relationship between types of fiscal decentralization and 
performance since this is only a descriptive statistical analysis rather than an inferential 
one.  This chapter discusses the employment of an empirical model to further identify 
the relationship between types of fiscal decentralization systems and several indicators of 
economic performance.  The model specifies the ordinary least square (OLS) analysis 
which treats six types of fiscal decentralization systems as the independent variable to 
explain the difference in performance indicators.   
 
I. Empirical methodology 
   Unlike the traditional method of measuring fiscal decentralization, the present 
method makes the assertion that the universally accepted view that fiscal decentralization 
should be regarded as a system encounters difficulties when used in conducting empirical 
studies.  The difficulties result primarily from the inaccessibility of time-series data for 
each country.  The present method categorized 54 countries into six types of fiscal 
decentralization systems which allow little room for expanding sample observations. 
   To design a more complete empirical model requires the inclusion of other control 
variables that might also contribute to the differences in economic performance.  
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Control variables abound to affect economic performance.  For example, the new 
institutional economists emphasize the significance of initial conditions when they make 
comparisons of performance across countries.  They assert that a country’s performance 
is affected by the initial conditions present at the start of the transition period (Zinnes et 
al, 2000).   A country that is isolated geographically or politically has a low level of 
human capital.  
   Currently, three types of initial conditions are recognized (Zinnes et al, 2000).  
First, “fixed” initial conditions refers to those that are invariant and unlikely to change, 
such as land-locked geography, natural resource endowment, culture, history, and climate.  
Second, “hard” initial conditions are primarily those that can be changed but in a gradual 
manner.  For example, both demographics and human capital are typically cited as hard 
initial conditions.  Third, “soft” initial conditions refer primarily to government policy, 
such as the incentives provided by a given tax code. 
   In our empirical analysis, we identify several categories of initial conditions based 
on the three abovementioned types.  Each category of initial condition is assigned one 
variable to capture its content.  The chosen variable may be collected based on its 
relevancy or on considerations of its availability.  Table 5.1 presents the categories of 




Table 5.1: Categories of initial conditions and their key variables 
Categories of initial conditions Key variable 
Physical geography Agricultural land as a % of total land area  
Macroeconomics  Savings rate as a % of GDP 
Demographics Urban population as a % of total population 
Globalization  Trade as a % of GDP 
Infrastructure  Number of internet users per 1000 population 
Wealth GDP per capita (PPP) 
Human capital School enrollment in tertiary education, % of gross 
education expenditure as a % of GNI 
Source: World Bank World Development Index, www.lib.umd.edu/researchport  
   Aside from the recognized categories of initial conditions, 1996 was selected as 
the starting year for all the initial conditions variables because most of the data on 
performance indicators and variables for cluster analysis are collected from 1997 forward.  
As a result, it is logical and reasonable to use 1996 as the starting year for all the initial 
conditions examined herein.  Initial conditions for most of the economic and social 
factors considered in this research are primarily collected from the World Bank World 
Development Index (WDI) 2006.  The WDI is the most widely used economic dataset 
for cross-country analysis.  While we attempt to ensure consistency in data across 
countries, the missing variable for some countries motivates us to seek alternative sources 
with which to complement our dataset for analysis.   
   
II. Literature review 
   Currently, a preponderance of the empirical models has been employed to 
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investigate the relationship between fiscal decentralization and economic performance.  
Nevertheless, most of the empirical studies used GDP growth rate as the dependent 
variable while the ratio of SNG expenditure/revenue over total government 
expenditure/revenue was employed as the proxy variable for fiscal decentralization.  
Empirical analyses such as these have been used for many years without further 
innovation.  Our empirical analysis, however, takes a bold but confident step in 
considering fiscal decentralization as the different types of fiscal decentralization systems.  
Then we treated different types of systems as the independent variable to explain the 
dependent variable, primarily the performance indicator.    
   To quantify the different types of fiscal decentralization systems is not an easy 
task.  Nevertheless, many empirical studies investigate the relationship between the 
target typology and economic performance.  Even though they are not the topic of fiscal 
decentralization, the methodology empirical studies employs does provide us with some 
insight into our own empirical model.  For example, Siegle (2001) treated two types of 
countries with dummy variable 1 and 0 by employing a logit model.  He investigated the 
relationship between democratization and economic growth by dividing the countries into 
prospering democratizer countries and lagging democratizer countries.  Then, Siegle 
treated the prospering democratizer countries as dummy variable 1 while the lagging 
democratizer countries as 0 to run the logit analysis.  The results of his research suggest 
that prospering democratizer countries demonstrate substantially better economic 
performance than lagging democratizer countries.   
   Siegle’s work is remarkable for its innovation in methodology and quantitative 
modeling.  Nevertheless, we are taking a conservative attitude toward the interpretation 
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of logit analysis.  Strictly speaking, the results of logit analysis actually contend that 
countries with better economic performance are more likely to be placed in prospering 
democratizer groups than lagging democratizer groups.  Consequently, to conclude that 
prospering democratizer countries exhibit better economic performance than lagging 
democratizer countries may pose causal relation problems for that empirical study.  
   In spite of its controversy in interpreting the results of logit analysis, Siegle’s 
work remains a motivating factor behind the methodology employed by the present 
research.  Reinhart et al (2003) also conducted the typology of countries throughout the 
world based on credit rating scores.  They then categorized countries into club A, club B 
and club C on the basis of institutional investor rating results, with the intention of 
investigating the impact of debt on the clubs of different countries.  Unlike Siegle’s 
work that uses a logit model, Reinhart et al created the dummy variable for countries in 
club A with the use of an interacting effect allowing the club A to have a different slope 
coefficient in the regression results.   
         
 III. OLS analysis 
   Motivated by the aforementioned arguments and methods, we formulated our own 
model to investigate the relationship between types of fiscal decentralization systems and 
economic performance.  In our cluster analysis, we grouped countries into six types of 
fiscal decentralization systems.  As a result, we created six dummy variables for each 
type of fiscal decentralization system, with type four as the reference group.  In terms of 
statistical analysis, it is usually desirable to use the type with the most samples as the 
reference group from which to derive statistical significance.  In our analysis, cluster 
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one is the type of fiscal decentralization system with the most countries in it.  
Nevertheless, in our cluster analysis, the countries in COMP FDS are placed in the most 
complete fiscal decentralization system.  We would, therefore, like to compare its 
performance with other types of fiscal decentralization systems.  For this reason we 
have chosen countries in COMP FDS as the reference group in our empirical model.  At 
this point, we should mention that the association does not involve with the concept of 
causal relationship.  In other words, even if we identify the positive association between 
certain types of fiscal decentralization systems and one performance indicator, it does not 
necessarily indicate this type of fiscal decentralization system results specifically in a 
more favorable economic performance. 
   We report the regression formula as follows: 
 
Yi = α + β1DV1 + β2DV2 + β3DV3 + β4DV4 + β5DV5 + β6DV6 + βi(I.C.)i+ µi
 
The subscript i denotes 54 country observations, and µi is the error term. 
Yi: The performance indicator, including GDP growth rate, inflation rate, level of income 
(GDP per capita, PPP), government effectiveness indicators, corruption indicator, and 
budget deficit. 
DV: Dummy variable from six types of fiscal decentralization system, including: DV1,   
         DV2, DV3, DV4, DV5, and DV6. 
I.C.: Initial conditions for each country in 1996, including:  
        GDP96: GDP per capita in 1996 
        GDP96PPP: GDP per capita in 1996 with purchasing power parity 
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        Saving96: saving rate in 1996, % of GDP 
        Internet96: number of internet users per 1000 people in 1996 
        Enroll96: school enrollment tertiary education in 1996, % of gross 
        Trade96: trade as a % of GDP in 1996 
        Urban96: urbanization in 1996 
        EDUGNI96: education expenditure as a % of GNI in 1996 
        Land96: agricultural land as a % of total land area in 1996  
 
   Table 5.2 demonstrates the OLS regression results.  To tackle the potential 
heteroscasticity problem in cross-sectional data analysis, we conduct OLS regression 
with the robust standard error.   
  In terms of GDP growth performance, countries in POCL FDS, UNIS FDS, and 
LERA FDS apparently exhibit higher performance levels than do countries in COMP 
FDS, while countries in HERA FDS and TRAN FDS have a lower level of GDP growth 
performance compared to the countries in COMP FDS.  Nevertheless, the coefficient 
value is minor and insignificant.  What we should emphasize is that the countries in 
POCL FDS and UNIS FDS are those with a low degree of political decentralization.  On 
the other hand, the regression results for level of income tell a totally different story.  
Countries in COMP FDS exhibit the highest income levels and countries in POCL FDS 
and UNIS FDS have significantly lower income levels than those in COMP FDS.  
Taking a look at inflation control performance, our analysis indicates that only countries 
in LERA FDS have a superior performance in this regard than do those countries grouped 
in COMP FDS.   
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   As for governance performance, only countries in LERA FDS and TRAN FDS 
perform better than countries in COMP FDS.  The coefficients, however, are minor 
which may suggest the slight difference that appears over the government effectiveness 
indicator among countries in different clusters.  In terms of the corruption indicator, 
countries in POCL FDS demonstrate the worst performance compared to countries in 
COMP FDS.  This result is also consistent with the outcome of inter-cluster analysis.    
   Lastly, the results of fiscal performance indicate that only countries in POCL FDS 
perform better than countries in COMP FDS.  In summary, our OLS analysis suggests 
that the countries in COMP FDS perform slightly better with respect to inflation control, 
level of income, government effectiveness, and fiscal deficit.    
 
V. Summary and preliminary findings 
   Judging from the preceding OLS regression model, we may establish preliminary 
findings as follows.  First, countries with the most complete FDS do not necessarily 
exhibit the best performance in economic growth during the given time frame as we 
would have otherwise expected.  However, the COMP FDS are associated with most 
economic performance indicators in many ways, including level of income, inflation 
control, government effectiveness, corruption control, and fiscal balance, on the basis of 
our OLS estimation.    While most emerging markets with rapid economic growth in 
recent years are placed in a group other than COMP FDS, this placement may tend to 
suggest a weaker GDP performance in COMP FDS.  
   Second, our OLS model also indicates that countries with politically centralized 
FDS are particularly conducive to enhanced economic growth.  These findings may tend 
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to somewhat minimize the significance – or even necessity -- of having independent 
officials and an elected governor at the SNG level in order to ensure the success of fiscal 
decentralization.  As a matter of fact, this discovery is not especially unusual because 
the independence of local officials or elected governors in developed countries is usually 
constrained by the rule of law while their counterparts in less developed countries might 
not be so constrained, leading us to conclude that the local officials in less developed 
countries in actuality possess more authority and discretion than those in more developed 
countries.   
   Finally, the traditional thinking on fiscal decentralization, i.e., the ratio of SNG 
expenditure/revenue over total government expenditure/revenue, finds no cogent 
expression and support in our OLS analysis, which bolsters the view that countries with 
high ratios of SNG expenditure/revenue are not necessarily associated with a faster pace 
of economic growth.  Countries in HERA FDS, COMP FDS, and POCL FDS are cluster 
countries with a high ratio of SNG expenditure/revenue over total government 
expenditure/revenue but display diversified outcomes of performance while countries in 
LERA FDS are cluster countries with a low ratio of SNG expenditure/revenue over total 
government expenditure/revenue but associate with a relatively better performance in 
inflation control, level of income, and governance performance.  
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Table 5.2: OLS regression with robust standard error 











































































































































































































R-squared 0.53 0.57 0.75 0.76 0.91 0.91 0.50 
N of obs 52 52 52 52 52 52 52 
*90% statistically significant, **95% statistically significant, ***99% statistically significant. 
Value in parenthesis is robust standard error. 
Saving96: saving rate in 1996, % of GDP 
Internet96: number of internet users per 1000 people in 1996 
Enroll96: school enrollment tertiary education in 1996, % of gross 
Trade96: trade as a % of GDP in 1996 
Urban96: urbanization in 1996 
EDUGNI96: education expenditure as a % of GNI in 1996 
Land96: agriculture land as a % of total land area in 1996  





Chapter VI: Conclusion and policy implications 
 
I. Conclusion 
   As more and more countries throughout the world embark upon the road to fiscal 
decentralization, a comprehensive understanding of the essential elements of this rising 
phenomenon becomes critical for policy makers.  In this dissertation, we explore two 
related questions.  The first question, “What types of fiscal decentralization systems are 
currently being implemented?” was examined using cluster analysis.  The second 
question we investigated was, “What are the performance strengths and weaknesses of 
each type of fiscal decentralization system?” for which we employed inter-cluster 
analysis and one empirical model.   
   On the basis of normative arguments proposed by Bahl & Martinez-Vazquez 
(2005), this research begins with the hypothesis that fiscal decentralization should be 
regarded as a holistic system.  With different components and arrangements within the 
system, each country naturally exhibits its unique approach to fiscal decentralization.  
We then employ the method of cluster analysis by grouping countries with similar fiscal 
decentralization systems together.  In our research, we identified six types of fiscal 
decentralization systems based on their idiosyncratic characteristics, which are HERA 
FDS (high expenditure/revenue assignment) , LERA FDS (low expenditure/revenue 
assignment), TRAN FDS (transfer revenue), COMP FDS (most complete), POCL 
(politically centralized), and UNIS FDS (unitary state) respectively. 
   By using cross-country datasets, we then establish a line of arguments centered on 
our findings, which resulted in the following observation: countries with the most 
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complete fiscal decentralization systems (COMP FDS) are associated with relatively 
better performances in terms of inflation control, level of income, governance and fiscal 
aspects.  Additionally, our inter-cluster analysis cast a clear-cut result that countries with 
systems exhibiting the highest degree of fiscal decentralization rank high in governance 
performance.  Our empirical analysis reveals that countries whose fiscal decentralization 
systems are marked by a high degree of political centralization also have high levels of 
economic growth.  Our empirical findings also demonstrate the positive associations 
between various economic performance indicators and a comprehensive, well-designed 
plan for fiscal decentralization. 
   We conclude that the most comprehensive system of fiscal decentralization, i.e., 
COMP FDS, often shares the following elements: there is (1) a federal state where (2) the 
SNG has both borrowing and taxing authority, and has (3) a high ratio of SNG 
expenditure/revenue to total government expenditure/revenue, and where (4) local 
officials enjoy a high degree of independence and autonomy from the central government.  
These components are essential for the success of fiscal decentralization but do not seem 
necessarily relevant at first blush to economic, governance, and fiscal performance.  The 
insufficiency of sample observations, which would naturally affect the accuracy of our 
empirical analysis, raises the possibility that the conclusions herein might have been 
somewhat skewed.  
 
II. Limitations 
   Although the research is noted for its innovation in methodology, there are 
constraints placed upon it due to inherent limitations, as we note here.  Data 
 95
 
insufficiency is one of these limitations. The limitations are found primarily in one of two 
ways.  First, inaccurate investigations of institutional arrangements are sometimes 
inappropriate for the type of analysis undertaken here.  For example, some developing 
countries may have been motivated to falsify data in order to receive financial aid from 
international organizations, including the World Bank, the IMF, and OECD.  Given 
these inherent limitations on credibility, we were constrained to drop certain sample 
observations from consideration.  Second, it is particularly difficult to acquire time 
series data on the institutional arrangements data.  Some institutional data simply do not 
change from year to year.  For example, SNGs are typically granted taxing power once 
in a given year, and it then resides with the SNG. It is a rare occurrence for the taxing 
power to be granted for one year, revoked in the following, and then granted again the 
following year.  Consequently, it makes more sense to use the cross-sectional data for a 
certain period of time as sample observations.   
      Furthermore, the variance and completeness of variables for cluster analysis also 
need to be strengthened.  Some may question the placement of Argentina, a frequent 
crisis-stricken country, in the same cluster as those with the most complete FDS.  
However, the financial crises visited upon Argentina mainly result from the soft budget 
constraints on the SNG’s expenditure.  Our cluster analysis, unfortunately, is unable to 
include the variable capturing the dimensions of hard budget constraints over the SNG, 
owing mainly to the difficulty of obtaining credible data.   
   Another possible limitation in our research is also associated with data credibility.  
In our cluster analysis we assigned variables that are relevant to the components in order 
to capture each dimension of fiscal decentralization systems.  Where we have been 
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unable to find desirable variables, we opted to use proxy variables instead.  For example, 
to capture the component of “degree of political decentralization,” we used the proxy 
variable of democracy in Polity IV.  Some may question the feasibility of using this 
proxy variable to capture the component of political decentralization.  Nonetheless, the 
Polity IV dataset is the most relevant and complete variable available for the use of 
cluster analysis.  In brief, the attempt to quantify the qualitative dimensions of fiscal 
decentralization systems is inherently difficult.  The aforementioned limitations are 
inevitable and would require extensive future research to either correct the defects or 
manage to mitigate its effect on the conclusions drawn therefrom.  
 
III. Policy implication 
      This research reviews the current body of knowledge in the literature on the 
measurements and typology of fiscal decentralization and its relationship to economic 
performance, governance performance, and fiscal performance.  We have noted the lack 
of empirical support for the assertions in the literature that fiscal decentralization can 
either facilitate or otherwise stimulate economic growth; this is so even if one adopts the 
concept that fiscal decentralization should be regarded as a holistic system.  We have, 
however, observed that countries with a low degree of political decentralization may still 
be accompanied by stellar economic growth. 
   The result of our cluster analysis suggests that COMP FDS is largely comprised 
of the most advanced economies in the world.  Even though countries in COMP FDS 
are not associated with the best performance in terms of GDP growth rate, they do exhibit 
the best performance in level of income.  This phenomenon may yield some 
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implications in terms of fiscal decentralization.  One possible implication is that 
decentralization is acting like the role of “superior good” in the economic sense.  It is 
only at relatively high levels of per capita income that decentralization is either 
demanded by, or becomes sufficiently attractive enough to, taxpayers.  That is,its 
benefits can be more fully exploited without the concomitant problems or disadvantages 
that tend to plague countries with lower levels of per capita income (Bahl & Lynn, 1992; 
Tanzi, 2002; Martinez-Vazquez & McNab, 2003).   
   This assertion appears compatible with the results of our cluster analysis.  As a 
matter of fact, our concept of fiscal decentralization systems consists of several 
components to supplement the assignment of public revenue.  It is challenging for an 
emerging market - usually associated with deficiencies in human resources and 
institutional arrangements - to consider the delegation of fiscal power to the SNG while 
simultaneously trying to formulate an economic development strategy which generally 
requires coordination and oversight from the central government.    
   An unexpected phenomenon uncovered by our analysis is that the politically 
centralized FDS exhibit the best performance in terms of economic growth.  Olson 
(1983) contends that the efficiency of an economy may be increased either by making 
narrow special-interest groups weaker or by making the government stronger in relation 
to them.  In the context of fiscal decentralization, the relationship between SNG and its 
central government can be analogous to that between special interest groups and 
government.  Some (Bird 1986; Kim 1995) appear to support this argument by 
interpreting the increase in the degree of fiscal decentralization as strengthening the hand 
of special interest groups and thereby resulting in slower economic growth overall.   
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   The analogy between SNGs and special interest groups does seem to find some 
support in our cluster analysis on politically centralized FDS.  While it may be 
reasonable to assume that there are some local officials and SNG’s governors who would 
spend with unbridled profligacy under circumstances emphasizing their own political 
interest rather than the welfare of the jurisdictional citizenry, the overall comparison 
between SNGs and special interest groups is too generalized and amorphous.  
Furthermore, we are convinced that what makes an SNG efficient and effective is not the 
centralization of fiscal authority; rather, it is well-developed institutional arrangements, 
such as adequate budget constraints over the local government, that promote fiscally 
disciplined behavior and, by extension, the ultimate efficacy of SNGs.   
   Aside from the previous arguments, we cannot overemphasize another possible 
counter-intuitive result, that countries with a high degree of political decentralization are 
usually advanced economies with strict enforcement of the rule of law, while countries 
with a low degree of political decentralization are usually authoritarian states without 
adequate institutional arrangements or regulatory frameworks.  Accordingly, local 
officials who enjoy a degree of decentralized fiscal authority as assigned to them by the 
central government may in fact be hampered by inappropriate regulations that are 
inadequately enforced through the rule of law.  Yet, local officials under more 
authoritarian regimes may enjoy greater fiscal power or a higher degree of discretionary 
spending power due to the lack of proper surveillance mechanisms, such as auditing 
systems or other tools for accountability.  This problem, however, requires a massive 
and thorough survey and investigation across countries all over the world.    
   Judging from the preceding examples and arguments, policy guidance may be 
 99
 
drawn from this course of research.  First, we would like to reiterate the important role 
traditional thinking plays in fiscal decentralization, or the so-called “quantitative” fiscal 
decentralization which gives emphasis to the assignment of government resources to the 
SNG.  Even though the traditional thinking on fiscal decentralization has been criticized 
for its limitations in capturing the multi-dimensions of fiscal decentralization, the 
assignment of expenditure/revenue still plays a crucial and vital role in the 
implementation of fiscal decentralization.  The assignment of expenditure/revenue 
resources is an essential element of fiscal decentralization, but it is by no means a 
sufficient one.  Also, the assignment of expenditure/revenue can be better accomplished 
through intergovernmental transfer and delegation of the taxing and borrowing powers 
that are so relevant to the build-up of qualitative dimensions of fiscal decentralization.  
Moreover, for an independent local official to function properly in the allocation of public 
resources to the jurisdiction, rather than playing the role of agent to the national 
government, the de facto assignment of expenditure/revenue resources is particularly 
salient.   
      Second, while our empirical evidence indicates the most complete FDS does not 
necessarily perform the best in terms of economic growth, the qualitative side of fiscal 
decentralization, i.e. COMP FDS and LERA FDS, remains associated with high scores in 
governance as well as fiscal performance.  Thus, there appears to be no rationale for us 
to recommend a qualitative side of reform in the fiscal decentralization system.  As we 
have described previously, the institutional reforms that enable the successful 
implementation of the FDS may be fully attainable only when the economy is fully 
developed.  Nonetheless, we would encourage the enabling of institutional reform for 
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fiscal decentralization systems throughout developing world as it is undeniably a 
long-term goal worthy of pursuit.  As to the problems relating to the lack of adequate 
human resources or management skills required for implementing such institutional 
reforms, we believe this role can be adequately fulfilled by various international 
organizations. With the development of decentralization strategies, as well as thorough 
investigations of decentralization practice, international organizations such as the World 
Bank, IMF, and OECD have specialized expertise in implementing programs for fiscal 
decentralization with well-established procedures.  Accordingly, the emerging markets 
that are deficient in these areas should be encouraged to seek help from these 
international organizations.  
      Third, even if the component of political decentralization does not exhibit an 
impact on performance indicators, we emphasize the significance of the component.  
The weak association between political decentralization and performance indicators may 
result from the existence of “hard budget constraints.”  As we have pointed out in 
previous sections, the hard budget constraint (e.g., the 3% ceiling on budget deficit 
imposed by the EU on member states) and the surveillance mechanism may serve to 
constrain the independence of local officials and curb their discretionary power over 
expenditures.  Under these circumstances, the elected governor of SNG and local 
officials may not enjoy an appreciable measure of independence as would have otherwise 
been expected.  Conversely, some countries suffered from the lack of hard budget 
constraints on the SNG.  It is not unusual for irresponsible spending behaviors of some 
local governments to result in a fiscal crisis for the entire country.  Hence, both hard and 




   As numerous countries throughout both the developed and developing world have 
been plagued by this dilemma, we propose a feasible way in which to facilitate political 
decentralization and correct the current spate of associated problems at the same time.  
We propose an evaluation system undertaken by an independent agency which lies 
outside of a national government and its judicial system.  The agency would keep an eye 
on the fiscal condition of the sub-national government, including fiscal deficit, debt 
ratings, budget and spending practices, etc.  Once the indicators of fiscal condition take 
a marked turn for the worse, the agency would be obliged to give a pre-warning 
notification to the designated local government.  The concept of this early warning 
system finds some support from the work by Goldstein, Kaminsky, and Reinhart (2000).  
Goldstein et al. attempted to establish an early warning system to assess the financial 
vulnerability of emerging markets after the circumstances of the Asian financial crisis in 
1997.  They identify several financial indicators and assign the threshold for each 
indicator as the guideline for the evaluation of financial vulnerability.  This principle can 
be equally applicable in gauging the health of an SNG’s fiscal condition provided that the 
essential components of fiscal conditions for an SNG have been properly identified.   
   It is essential that all evaluations, information and outcomes, be made available to 
the public.  This requirement ensures and honors the people’s right to know.  The 
availability of credit ratings on state and municipal bonds issued by local governments in 
the United States is an example of how the aforementioned function is adequately served.  
Nevertheless, the system of credit ratings for state and municipal bonds remains 
insufficient for the functional establishment of a comprehensive evaluation system.  In 
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sum, political decentralization, along with an early warning evaluation system is much 
more desirable in the institutional arrangements for enhancing the prospects of an FDS 
being able to achieve an appreciable level of success.   
 
IV. The need for future research 
   While we have accomplished the objectives of the dissertation set forth in Chapter 
I, we believe that this course of research has highlighted the need for future research into 
the types of fiscal decentralization systems, as noted below.   
   First, the facilitation of datasets remains the top priority for any future research.  
Although we have attempted to collect the most readily available cross-sectional dataset 
around the world, having access to the time series datasets for each country would enable 
us to observe and better pinpoint the shift in membership from one cluster to another for a 
specific country.  Meanwhile, the time-series dataset would also enable us to undertake 
empirical analysis with more sample observations and thus enhance the confidence and 
thereby the significance of our outcomes.  It may not be practically possible to construct 
institutional datasets based on a time-series format due to the fact that some aspects of 
institutional arrangements for fiscal decentralization system can remain fixed and 
constant for many years.  Bearing this limitation in mind, we can start by turning our 
focus and efforts on the developed world, e.g., OECD countries, which usually provide a 
more thorough and comprehensive investigation in institutional datasets. 
   Finally, we would further suggest the use of variables that can account for or 
depict the hard budget constraints over expenditure behavior of SNGs.  As noted earlier, 
cluster analysis requires more variables to adequately capture each component of fiscal 
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decentralization systems.  With more relevant variables on hand for each component, we 
may start from principle component analysis and factor analysis to identify the most 








Cluster 1 Azerbaijan, Belarus, China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz, Tajikistan,  
Cluster 2 Albania, Belgium, Guatemala, Hungary, Indonesia, Italy, Netherland, Peru, Portugal, 
South Africa, Spain, UK 
Cluster 3 Czech, Finland, France, India, New Zealand, Russia, Sweden, Taiwan,  
Cluster 4 Bulgaria, Colombia, Costa Rica, Croatia, Estonia, Georgia, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Nicaragua, Poland, Romania, Thailand, Ukraine,  
Cluster 5 Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Denmark, Germany, Japan, 




Cluster 1 Azerbaijan, Belarus, China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz, Tajikistan 
Cluster 2 Bulgaria, Croatia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Nicaragua, Romania, Thailand, 
Ukraine  
Cluster 3 Albania, Guatemala, Indonesia, Peru, South Africa, UK 
Cluster 4 Austria, Bolivia, Brazil, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Mexico, Mongolia, Norway, 
Poland, Spain, Switzerland, US 
Cluster 5 Argentina, Georgia, Russia 




Cluster 1 Argentina, Canada, Denmark, Finland, India, Lithuania, Russia, Sweden,  
Cluster 2 Australia, Austria, Brazil, Germany, Japan, Mexico, Norway, Switzerland, US 
Cluster 3 Bolivia, Colombia, Hungary, Italy, Korea, Netherland, Poland, South Africa, Spain, 
UK 
Cluster 4 Azerbaijan, Belarus, China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz, Tajikistan,  
Cluster 5 Albania, Guatemala, Indonesia, Peru,  
Cluster 6 Belgium, Czech, France, Mongolia, New Zealand, Portugal, Taiwan,  
Cluster 7 Bulgaria, Costa Rica, Croatia, Estonia, Georgia, Latvia, Nicaragua, Romania, 




Cluster 1 Azerbaijan, Belarus, China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz, Tajikistan 
Cluster 2 Bolivia, Brazil, Hungary, Mexico, South Africa 
Cluster 3  Canada, Denmark, Germany, Switzerland, US 
Cluster 4 Lithuania, Nicaragua 
Cluster 5 Argentina, Georgia, India, Russia, Sweden, Ukrain,  
Cluster 6 Albania, Bulgaria, Guatemala, Indonesia, Italy, Mongolia, Peru, Poland, UK 
Cluster 7  Croatia, Estonia, Romania, Thailand 




Cluster 1 Bulgaria, Colombia, Costa Rica, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Nicaragua, Poland, 
Romania,   
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Cluster 2 Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz,  
Cluster 3 Argentina, Brazil, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Germany, India, Japan, Sweden, 
Switzerland, US 
Cluster 4 Croatia, Thailand,  
Cluster 5 Albania, Belgium, Guatemala, Hungary, Indonesia, Netherlands, Peru, Portugal, 
South Africa, UK 
Cluster 6 Georgia, Russia, Ukraine,  
Cluster 7 Azerbaijan, Tajikistan,  
Cluster 8 Australia, Austria, Bolivia, Czech, France, Italy, Korea, Mexico, Mongolia, New 
Zealand, Norway, Spain, Taiwan,  




Cluster 1 Belgium, Czech, France, New Zealand, Portugal,  
Cluster 2 Bulgaria, Colombia, Croatia, Estonia, Latvia, Nicaragua, Romania, Ukraine,  
Cluster 3 Albania, Guatemala, Hungary, Indonesia, Netherlands, Peru, South Africa, UK 
Cluster 4 Belarus, China, Kazakhstan,  
Cluster 5 Costa Rica, Thailand,  
Cluster 6 Azerbaijan, Kyrgyz, Tajikistan,  
Cluster 7 Canada, Denmark, Finland, India, Japan, Sweden,   
Cluster 8 Switzerland, US 
Cluster 9 Argentina, Georgia, Lithuania, Russia, Taiwan,  
Cluster 10 Australia, Austria, Bolivia, Brazil, Germany, Italy, Korea, Mexico, Mongolia, 





























Cluster 1 Argentina, Australia, Austria, Brazil, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Germany, India, 
Japan, Mexico, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, US 
Cluster 2 Albania, Belgium, Bolivia, Bulgaria, Colombia, Costa Rica, Czech, France, 
Guatemala, Hungary, Indonesia, Italy, Korea, Latvia, Mongolia, Netherland, New 
Zealand, Peru, Poland, Portugal, South Africa, Spain, Taiwan, Thailand, UK 
Cluster 3 Kyrgyz,  
Cluster 4 Croatia, Estonia, Georgia, Lithuania, Nicaragua, Romania, Russia, Ukraine,  




Cluster 1 Austria, Bolivia, Brazil, Germany, India, Italy, Korea, Mexico, Mongolia, Norway, 
Poland, Russia, Spain, Taiwan 
Cluster 2 Belgium, Czech, France, New Zealand, Portugal 
Cluster 3 Albania, Guatemala, Hungary, Indonesia, Netherlands, Peru, South Africa, UK 
Cluster 4 Argentina, Australia, Canada, Demark, Japan, Finland, Sweden, Switzerland, United 
States 
Cluster 5 Azerbaijan, Belarus, China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz, Tajikistan 
Cluster 6 Bulgaria, Croatia, Colombia, Costa Rica, Estonia, Georgia, Latvia, Lithuania, 




Cluster 1 Belgium, Czech, France, New Zealand, Portugal,  
Cluster 2 Australia, Canada, Denmark, Finland, India, Sweden, Taiwan,   
Cluster 3 Albania, Guatemala, Hungary, Indonesia, Netherland, Peru, South Africa, UK 
Cluster 4 Argentina, Croatia, Estonia, Georgia, Latvia, Lithuania, Nicaragua, Romania, 
Russia, Ukraine,  
Cluster 5 Austria, Brazil, Bolivia, Colombia, Germany, Italy, Japan, Korea, Mexico, 
Mongolia, Norway, Poland, Spain, Switzerland, US 
Cluster 6 Bulgaria, Costa Rica, Thailand,  




Cluster 1 Albania, Bulgaria, Costa Rica, Guatemala, Thailand,  
Cluster 2 Austria, Bolivia, Brazil, Germany, Japan, Korea, Mexico, Norway, Switzerland, US 
Cluster 3  Argentina, Australia, Canada, Denmark, Finland, India, New Zealand, Russia, 
Sweden, Taiwan,   
Cluster 4 Azerbaijan, Kyrgyz, Tajikistan,  
Cluster 5 Belgium, Czech, France, Hungary, Indonesia, Italy, Mongolia, Netherland, Peru, 
Poland, Portugal, South Africa, Spain, UK 
Cluster 6 Belarus, China, Kazakhstan,  
Cluster 7  Lithuania, Nicaragua,  







Cluster 1 Australia, Canada, Denmark, Finland, India, Japan, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, 
Taiwan, US 
Cluster 2 Romania, Nicaragua, Estonia, Croatia, Ukraine 
Cluster 3 Albania, Guatemala, Indonesia, Peru, South Africa, UK 
Cluster 4 Austria, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Mongolia, Netherlands, Poland, Spain 
Cluster 5 Bulgaria, Costa Rica, Latvia, Thailand 
Cluster 6 Belgium, Czech, France, New Zealand, Portugal 
Cluster 7 Argentina, Lithuania, Russia 
Cluster 8 Tajikistan, Kyrgyz, Kazakhstan, China, Belarus, Azerbaijan 




Cluster 1 Austria, Bolivia, Japan, Korea, Mexico, Mongolia, Norway, Spain 
Cluster 2 Bulgaria, Colombia, Costa Rica, Croatia, France, Italy, Latvia, Poland,  
Thailand 
Cluster 3 Kyrgyz 
Cluster 4 Canada, Czech, Denmark, Finland, India, New Zealand, Sweden, Taiwan 
Cluster 5 China 
Cluster 6 Argentina, Estonia, Georgia, Lithuania, Nicaragua, Romania, Russia, Ukraine 
Cluster 7 Belarus, Kazakhstan 
Cluster 8 US, Switzerland, Germany, Brazil, Australia 
Cluster 9 Azerbaijan, Tajikistan,  
Cluster 10 Albania, Belgium, Guatemala, Hungary, Indonesia, Netherlands, Peru, Portugal, 
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